strateji, güvenlik, araştırma, istihbarat, komplo teorileri, mizah, teknoloji, mk ultra, nwo
Lor Koh and Islam Dara Canyon
Key Terrain and Leadership Data
Afghanistan’s Pashtun rural population has been the source of manpower, funds, shelter, support, and intelligence for the repeated insurgencies that have plagued that unfortunate county since their monarch, Zahir Shah, was overthrown in 1973. In the general unrest that followed, insurgents opposed Mohammad Daoud’s army until he was overthrown by the communists who served in succession – Taraki, Amin, Karmal, and Najibullah. The communist leadership figures, in turn, were deposed by the anti-communist “Seven Party Alliance” that was soon battling among itself for control of Kabul until the Taliban Movement emerged. The Taliban was also faced with resisting insurgent forces, primarily from the non-Pashtun ethnic groups inhabiting Afghanistan’s northern provinces. Afghanistan’s rural insurgents are generally poorly educated, if literate at all, and succeeding generations of insurgents rely upon story-telling from earlier generations of fighters to gain knowledge of tactics that are applicable to their particular culture and terrain. There are no military schools available to them where leadership training can be taught and absorbed, and as a result the lessons learned from far away battlefields are seldom applied in Afghanistan. They commonly use the same tactics, terrain, and base areas that were used successfully by their fathers and grandfathers. Their general tendency to utilize memorization – as they did while studying Islam in madrassas – reinforces their tendency toward repetition.
Consequently, a careful study of the history of insurgent operations in specific regions of Afghanistan may be especially valuable. Base areas, infiltration routes, river fords, hide sites, and ambush locations used successfully against the Soviet Union’s forces and their communist allies may be used by later insurgent generations who learned of these locations’ significance from storytelling by their mujahedin fathers.
Many of Helmand Province’s mujahedin who fought the Soviets are now affiliated with the current insurgents. They have the tendency to use base areas, infiltration routes, safe areas, and even the same ambush sites that were utilized in the past. In the case of the multiple bases they developed in Lor Koh, they are strategically positioned near Bakwa and Golestan districts, the key roads in the area, and the mountain canyons may now be used as base areas by the Taliban forces. The same is highly probable of a base called Islam Dara, situated in the Khakrez District in northern Kandahar Province. Together these two historical mujahedin bases form a historical operational precedent for Afghanistan’s insurgents in the south that cuts across the volatile region of Helmand Province.
Key leaders involved in the anti-Soviet jihad, or their sons and other family members, are probably still living in the region. Individuals currently involved with the Taliban are likely to be utilizing their same base areas, and those former mujahedin leaders now allied with the Government of Afghanistan probably know the locations used by their former colleagues.
Lor Koh in Farah Province A Key Mujahedin Base Area
Lor Koh is a large mountain located approximately 30 kilometers southeast of Farah city at 32° 31′ 29” N/062° 41′ 22” E2 [see map and satellite image on pages 5 and 6]. It was renamed Sharafat Koh, or Honor Mountain, by the mujahedin once they established bases in the mountain’s canyons. The mountain is roughly shaped with a plateau top rising approximately 1,500 meters above the desert floor. Lor Koh has steep slopes and its top is often covered with snow. There are many large and small canyons (kals) cutting into the mountain. Sheikh Razi Baba Canyon penetrates into the mountain’s north side. Kale-e Amani Canyon is located on the mountain’s northwestern side and is adjacent to Sheikh Razi Baba. On the west is Kale-e Kaneske Canyon, and continuing counterclockwise around the mountain, there is Jar-e Ab Canyon on the southwest end of the mountain that connects with the Kale-e Kaneske Canyon. The Tangira Canyon is found in the south and is the widest of the mountain’s canyons. It has the most water but the mujahedin avoided it because it was the only valley wide enough to allow the entry of armored vehicles. To the east and also opening south is the Khwaja Morad Canyon where the Khwaja Morad Shrine is located. All of the canyons are accessible from the mountain’s plateau. Lor Koh is about 12 kilometers from Highway 1 and 20 kilometers from Highway 517.
The mujahedin attacked convoys near Karvangah, Charah, and Shivan and the Soviets maintained posts at Karvangah, Charah, and Velamekh to protect the convoys. The mujahedin established their first base in Lor Koh in Tangira Canyon in 1979, but the organizing tribal groups, consisting of Achakzai, Noorzai, Barakzai, and Alizai tribes, moved to a new base in Jare-e Ab Canyon until the Soviets attacked them in 1980. Following this attack, the mujahedin moved to Kale-e Kaneske Canyon, the strongest base in the mountain.
The opening into Kale-e Kaneske Canyon is only two to three meters wide and is in solid rock. It is deep and requires 35 to 40 minutes to walk from the entrance to its end and the opening section is shielded from observation from above. It contains a stream, a waterfall, and trees and the canyon widens into a three or four hectare opening at the end of the canyon.
In 1985, tribal disputes over leadership and the disposition of spoils resulted in the mujahedin splitting. New insurgent bases occupied by members from various tribes were established in different valleys:
· The Noorzai tribe’s mujahedin under Haji Abdul Kheleq moved into Sheikh Razi Baba Canyon.
· The Mujahedin from the Alizai and Barakzai tribes under the leadership of Haji Ghulan Rasul Shiwani Rasul Akhundzada relocated to the Kale-e Amani Canyon.
· Mawlawi Mohammad Shah and the mujahedin from the Achakzai tribe remained in the Kale-e Kaneske Canyon. Mohammad Shah’s deputy was Haji Nur Ahmad Khairkhaw.
The Domestic Operational Law (DOPLAW) Handbook for Judge Advocates is a product of the Center for Law and Military Operations (CLAMO). Its content is derived from statutes, Executive Orders and Directives, national policy, DoD Directives, joint publications, service regulations and field manuals, and lessons learned by judge advocates and other practitioners throughout federal and state government. This edition includes a substantial revision of Chapter 3, it incorporates new guidance as set for forth Department of Defense Directive 3025.18, Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA), it provides amplifying information on wildfire response, emergency mutual assistance compacts, the role of the National Guard and Army units such as Army North and Joint Task Force—Civil Support, and it discusses the 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil spill.
The Handbook is designed to serve as a working reference and training tool for judge advocates. However, this Handbook is not a substitute for independent research. With the exception of footnoted doctrinal material, the information contained in this Handbook is not doctrine. Judge Advocates advising in this area of the law should monitor developments in domestic operations closely as the landscape continues to evolve. Further, the information and samples provided in this Handbook are advisory only. Finally, the content and opinions expressed in this Handbook do not represent the official position of the U.S. Army or the other services, the National Guard Bureau, the Office of The Judge Advocate General, The Judge Advocate General’s Legal Center and School, or any other government agency.
G. The Department of Defense Civil Disturbance Plans
Formerly, DoD’s Civil Disturbance Operations (CDO) plan was known as “GARDEN PLOT.” Since the creation of the Department of Homeland Security and USNORTHCOM however, DoD has delegated to geographic combatant commanders responsibility for developing CDO Contingency Plans (CONPLANs). These geographic commanders’ CONPLANs provide guidance and direction for planning, coordinating, and executing military operations during domestic civil disturbances.
1. Civil Disturbance Operations Mission
Broadly stated, the CDO mission assists civil authorities in restoring law and order in the United States and its territories.58 This mission statement, while not duplicating the language in the Insurrection Act allowing for the use of federal forces to “suppress” insurrection, provides wide latitude to the President to use federal forces to assist civil law enforcement in “restoring” law and order.
The restoration of law and order must be distinguished from the preservation of law and order. CDO mission statements do not allow the joint civil disturbance task force commander to undertake preservation missions. It is generally agreed that missions to restore law and order include dispersing unauthorized assemblages, patrolling disturbed areas, maintaining essential transportation and communications systems, setting up roadblocks, and cordoning off areas. Care should be taken before a military commander accepts missions that are routine maintenance of civil order.
2. Combatant Commanders’ CONPLANs
The CONPLANs provide the basis for all preparation, deployment, employment, and redeployment of Department of Defense component forces, including National Guard forces called to active federal service, for use in domestic civil disturbance operations, in support of civil authorities as directed by the President. The concept of a civil disturbance operation is multi-phased: Phase 0, Shape; Phase I, Anticipate; Phase II, Respond (deployment can occur in either Phase I or Phase II); Phase III, Operate; Phase IV, Stabilize; and Phase V, Transition (redeployment). Prior to deployment, military forces maintain five preparedness postures, called Civil Disturbance Conditions (CIDCONS) in order to alert and react to potential civil disturbance operations. Changes in the CIDCON level are directed by the JDOMS.
3. The Standing Rules for the Use of Force for U.S. Forces
Civil disturbance operations are conducted in accordance with Appendix L of the Standing Rules of Engagement/Standing Rules for the Use of Force for U.S. Forces (SRUF). Guidance on how and when forces can use force in a CDO mission are detailed in that annex. Although the CJCSI is classified, Annex L is not and can be shared with our mission partners.
a. Custody and Detention
All apprehensions should be made by the civil police force unless they are not available or require assistance. Military forces have the authority to detain rioters, looters, or other civilians committing criminal offenses. Civilians taken into custody should be transferred to civilian law enforcement authorities as soon as possible.
All members of the force must remember that state and federal criminal law and procedure govern apprehension. Apprehension is justified only on the basis of probable cause to believe that an offense has been committed and that the person to be apprehended committed the offense. Soldiers should not question detainees beyond basic pedigree such as name and address. If formal questioning of an offender is necessary, civilian police should conduct the interview. If civilian police are not available, CID agents or military police may conduct interviews only if the interview is essential to the civil disturbance mission. Actions taken by Soldiers that do not conform to criminal law constitutional standards could jeopardize future prosecution and subject Soldiers and their Commanders to criminal and/or civil liability.
b. Search and Seizure
CDO CONPLANs anticipate that military forces will generally not be involved in searches unless there is “an immediate danger of violence, destruction of evidence, or escape of violent persons unless the search is conducted without delay.” In all other cases, local authorities should conduct searches. When required to perform searches, federal armed forces may conduct warrantless searches under the same constitutional parameters imposed upon law enforcement officials. Joint Civil Disturbance Task Force forces conducting a warrantless search will fully document the reasons for the search as soon as is reasonably convenient.69 Generally these searches are limited to the following incidents.
(1) Stop and Frisk
If there is a reasonable suspicion based upon articulable facts that a person has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime, that person may be temporarily stopped and questioned about his activities. The stop must be limited in duration to that which is reasonably necessary to investigate the suspicion. If there is a reasonable suspicion based on articulable facts that a person is armed or is carrying instruments of violence and that the individual presents an immediate risk of harm, members of the armed force may conduct a “frisk” (an external “patdown” of the clothing) for weapons. Any weapons found during a frisk may be removed from the individual and seized.
(2) Search Incident to Lawful Apprehension
A person lawfully detained may be searched for weapons or destructible evidence. A search for weapons or destructible evidence may also be conducted in the area where the detained person could reach with a sudden movement to obtain a weapon or destroy evidence.
(3) Exigent circumstances
Military forces assisting law enforcement may make a search without a warrant when they have reason to believe (probable cause) that weapons, objects related to criminal activity, or persons believed to have committed an offense, are in the place to be searched; and they have reason to believe that the delay necessary to obtain a search warrant would result in removal of the weapons or destruction of the objects related to criminal activity. For example, Joint Civil Disturbance Task Force forces may stop and search an automobile without a warrant when there is reason to believe that the automobile contains weapons or instruments of violence and/or contains an individual reasonably believed to have committed violence.
Military forces in a civil disturbance operation may make an immediate entry into a building when there is reason to believe that entry is necessary to prevent injury to persons, serious damage to property, loss of evidence, to protect public safety, or to render aid to someone who is in danger.
(5) Hot pursuit
Military forces pursuing a person who they have reason to believe has just committed a serious crime, may enter a vehicle or building believed to be entered by the suspect and search the building or vehicle for the person or any weapons that might be used to further his escape.
(6) Plain View
During the course of otherwise lawful activity, military forces may seize any unlawful weapons or objects related to criminal activity which they observe in plain view. When conducting warrantless searches that require a probable cause determination, military forces can obtain advice from a judge advocate; however, the probable cause determination must be made personally by the individual desiring to conduct the search.
If a search warrant is required, local civil authorities should obtain judicially issued search warrants. If local civilian authorities are not available, judge advocates need to be prepared to provide advice on probable cause to military authorities before they approach a local judge or magistrate for a search warrant.
When feasible, all searches conducted by military personnel will be conducted by two personnel with the actual search performed by someone of the same sex.76 A hand receipt or some similar document should be prepared when items of personal property are seized from an individual.
c. Confinement Facilities
The Joint Civil Disturbance Task Force should not operate a detention facility. Any person apprehended should be turned over to the police for detention. Military correctional facilities cannot be used to detain civilians. If available civilian detention facilities cannot accommodate the number of detained persons who are awaiting arraignment, the Joint Civil Disturbance Task Force commander must seek the approval of the SCRAG and Combatant Commander to set up a temporary detention facility.
Should the Task Force be required to operate a detention facility, the detention facility standards and operations should conform, to the maximum extent possible, to current DoD confinement facility operations and will be under the professional supervision and control of Military Police personnel. The establishment and operation of military detention facilities is a temporary expedient and is authorized only until such time as the custody of detained persons can be transferred to civil authorities.
d. Riot Control Agents
Normally, for CDO the deployment and use of riot control agents is allowed as a matter of U.S. policy. However, initial approval authority for its deployment and use may be retained at a level higher than the Joint Civil Disturbance Task Force Commander and may require a specific request.
BIRMINGHAM, AL—U.S. District Judge Abdul K. Kallon today sentenced Ulugbek Kodirov, an Uzbek national who has lived in the United States since 2009, to 15 years and eight months in prison for providing material support to terrorism, threatening to kill President Barack Obama, and illegally possessing a weapon.
U.S. Attorney for the Northern District of Alabama Joyce White Vance, Department of Justice Assistant Attorney General for National Security Lisa Monaco; FBI Special Agent in Charge Patrick J. Maley; Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF) Special Agent in Charge (SAC) Glenn N. Anderson; Secret Service SAC Roy Sexton; and Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) SAC Raymond R. Parmer, Jr. announced the sentence.
Kodirov, 22, of Uzbekistan, pleaded guilty in February to one count of providing material support to terrorism, one count of threatening to kill the president, and one count of possession of a firearm by an illegal alien. Kodirov is the first person to be convicted in the Northern District of Alabama for providing material support to terrorism.
U.S. Attorney Vance praised the quick response and careful investigative work by the Joint Terrorism Task Force for the Northern District of Alabama, which led to Kodirov’s arrest before anyone was harmed. “This case is a sobering reminder that terrorist activity can happen anywhere,” said U.S. Attorney Vance. “Our community has the coordinated efforts of federal, state, and local law enforcement to thank for the immediacy of their response to this threat. This case has a happy ending—Kodirov is going to prison for more than 15 years, and no one in our community was hurt,” she said.
“This case demonstrates the continuing threat posed by violent extremists in this country and how law enforcement works together to neutralize such plots,” said Assistant Attorney General Monaco. “Today, Mr. Kodirov is being held accountable for his actions thanks to the efforts of the many agents, analysts, and prosecutors involved in this matter.”
FBI SAC Maley thanked the members of the Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF), which includes the Jefferson and Shelby, Alabama County Sheriff’s Offices; Birmingham, Hoover, and the University of Alabama at Birmingham Police Departments; the Transportation Security Agency; Secret Service; ATF; and the Department of Homeland Security. He also thanked the Pelham and Leeds, Alabama Police Departments for their assistance in this case. “The JTTF has been diligently investigating and building partnerships to protect Alabama from terrorists since 9/11, and its efforts put it in the unique position to interdict a violent act of terrorism. This case serves as a reminder of the dangers of the Internet on radicalizing our youth right in our own back yards, and all citizens and organizations need to remain vigilant on the ever-increasing threat from home-grown extremists,” he said.
“Mr. Ulugbek Kodirov came to the United States as a student and a welcomed guest. To date, that has dramatically changed,” said ATF SAC Anderson. “Kodirov will be serving time at the Federal Bureau of Prisons for his threats against President Obama and illegal possession of a firearm. It is shocking that he was willing to arm himself with hand grenades to further his agenda. Thankfully, this recipe for disaster was averted. ATF and our law enforcement partners will continue to work cases like these and other violent crime to keep cities, small and large, across America safe every day,” Anderson said.
“In the fight against domestic terrorism, it is absolutely essential that federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies work closely together to share information and chase down leads,” said HSI SAC Parmer. “In this case, the JTTF worked exactly as it is intended to by identifying and eliminating a serious threat to the president of the United States.”
“The Secret Service values its role as a member of the Joint Terrorism Task Force and our partnerships with task force members representing local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies,” said Secret Service SAC Sexton. “A dangerous situation was thwarted and the person behind it was stopped because of the hard work of our dedicated task force investigators.”
Kodirov acknowledged in his guilty plea that he had been in communication with an individual whom he believed to be a member of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and that Kodirov interpreted these conversations to mean that he should kill President Obama. Kodirov then took steps to obtain weapons to carry out his plans to kill the president. The IMU is designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization by the U.S. State Department. Kodirov also showed jihadist websites and videos on his computer to another individual and told that person that he wanted to assist others in jihad overseas, according to his plea agreement.
Kodirov also acknowledged that he had lengthy conversations in July 2011 with a different individual about Kodirov’s desire to kill President Obama and possible ways to carry out the assassination. That individual traveled to Birmingham to meet Kodirov and introduced him to another individual, an undercover agent, from whom Kodirov intended to obtain weapons he would use to kill the president.
The three men met on July 13, 2011, at a motel in Leeds. In that meeting, the agent presented a fully automatic Sendra Corporation Model M15-A1 machine gun, a sniper rifle with a telescopic sight, and four disassembled hand grenades and asked Kodirov if he would like to use any of them to “carry out his plan to kill the president,” according to the plea agreement. Kodirov chose the M15-A1 machine gun and the hand grenades and left the meeting with the weapons. Agents arrested Kodirov before he left the motel.
Kodirov entered the United States on a student visa in June 2009. His visa was revoked on April 1, 2010, for failing to enroll in school. Thereafter, he was unlawfully present within the United States. He was living in an extended-stay motel in Pelham at the time of his arrest.
The FBI, ATF, HSI, and Secret Service investigated the case. Assistant U.S. Attorneys Michael W. Whisonant Sr. and Ryan K. Buchanan prosecuted the case with assistance from the Counterterrorism Section of the Justice Department’s National Security Division.
This is the design documents for the Allure Defender system. This document is a high level design and API of the components that make up the Allure Defender system. We outline all the high-level pieces and then the individual components, their behaviors, expected input/outputs, and relationships. We will discuss specific implementation and design choices and languages and libraries that will be used. In addition we will cover specific user cases and illustrate some running examples. Last we refer to a running system which implements many of the components we cover in the document.
The goal of the document is for a designer to create a working system and or verify a working system conforms to the specifications outlined in the document.
The document generation component will create documents (henceforth referred to as Decoy Documents, or DD for short) in various formats (e.g., Word, Excel, PDF, Powerpoint, email messages, Instant Messaging logs, … ) that contain one of several features :
• a “mark” allowing Allure Defender to determine whether a file is a DD, and possibly allow legitimate users to avoid accessing/triggering the DD;
• one or more “beacons”, which will cause the application processing the DD to emit some sort of discernible signal;
• Enticing Information (henceforth referred to as EI) which, if acted upon by the adversary, will allow detection. Such information includes URLs (for various protocols), account information (e.g., username/password), and others that may be developed in the future; and
• Enticing Content (henceforth referred to as EC) that will attract t he adversary to the DD (e.g., if they are using a search function) without raising suspicion, will support the presence of the EI in the document, and will allow the DDs to “fit in” with the rest of the environment on which t hey have been deployed.
DDs may be deployed on servers, databases, user desktops and laptop, mobile devices, honeypots, or other locations. It is desirable t hat all of these seeding techniques be supported.
The EC may be generated based on templates, synthesized from private sources (e.g., by mining existing documents at the directory /account/system/server to be seeded), synthesized from public sources (e.g., documents acquired through search engines) based on high-level templates, or synthesized from public sources using information mined from existing documents at the directory/account/system/server to be seeded. Any combination of these techniques may be used to generate DDs, and a specific DD may be t he result of several such techniques being used simultaneously.
The misbehavior detection component consists of a variety of subcomponents, some of which are specific to the beacon techniques used:
• honeypot servers, pointed to by URLs and similar information;
• intrusion detection systems combined with legitimate servers/services, when the lat ter can be used for detection purposes without compromising primary functionality (e.g., invalid username password login attempts, specific directories in a filesystem or web server hierarchy, DNS server queries, and so on) ;
• Data Leakage Prevention (DLP) subsystems, which may operate at various points in the system, e.g. , network, filesystem, memory, and others. The DLP may be a priori aware of the identity and location of the DDs, or it may be able to identify them on the fly via the “mark “.
The design of the architecture (see Figure 1) attempts to cleanly divide the functionality of the different subsystems into self-managing components allowing maximum flexibility of the system to adopt to changes while allowing all the components to seamlessly work together. The design reflects the facts that (a) documents may be requested via different interfaces (e.g., webserver front-end, client-side logic interacting over the network, client-side application with generation library, and possibly others); (b) the documents may contain a combination of enticing information, marks and beacons, based on the desired configuration, (c) the corresponding detection capabilities can vary (and should be extensible so that we can add further capabilities as future research directs), and (d) the documents, and specifically the enticing content, may be generated through a variety of means.
Örneğin feys sayfalarında "Atatürk’ü seven 1.923.000 kişi arıyoruz" içerikli iletiler yayımlayıp, "Korkmayanlar paylaşsın",
veya büyük önderin bir fotoğrafının altına "Seni seviyorummmm" yazmak mıdır?
1920-1938 yılları arasındaki, Cumhuriyet’in tam bağımsız bir devlet oluşundaki inançlı, onurlu, güvenli devrim yolculuğuna sahip çıkmak mıdır?
Osmanlı pastası yer altı ve yer üstü kaynaklarıyla, küresel çetelerin arsız iştihası için mükemmel bir lezzettir. Bu pasta kapı önünde bekleyen işbirlikçilere şöyle ucundan tattırılmalı, geri kalan büyük parça ise küresel çetelerin taşeronu büyük devletler tarafından paylaşılmalıdır.
Osmanlı onlar için adı var kendi yok bir devlettir. "Hasta adam"dır. "Hasta adam" bilerek ve isteyerek, bir neşterle şah damarı kesilerek ve hürriyetten yoksun bırakılacak Osmanlı "manda" ve/veya "himaye" adı altında, galip devletler tarafından kendisine lütfedilen topraklar üzerinde, bitkisel hayatını sürdürecektir.
Bu nedenle Osmanlı "adam yerine konulup" Paris Barış Konferansı’na çağrılmamıştır. (18 Ocak 1919)
Osmanlı’nın tüm ulusal kaynakları ve zenginlikleri ikbal ve saltanat derdine düşmüş Vahdettin’in Sadrazam’ı Damat ferit Paşa’nın imzaladığı Sevr ile elinden alınmış ve yurt toprakları emperyalist güçler ve onların kuklaları tarafından işgal edilmiştir.
Bu "ahval ve şerait içinde dahi", Mustafa Kemal Paşa, ulusal meclisleşen Erzurum Kongresi’nde (23 Temmuz-7 Ağustos 1919) altını kırmızı kalemle çizdiği olmazsa olmazlarını sonuç bildirgesi olarak yayımlatıp, delegelere imzalatmıştır. Bu tarihten itibaren başlayan milli hareketin "reis"idir Mustafa Kemal…
*Milli sınırlar içinde vatan bir bütündür, parçalanamaz.
*Ulusal irade hakim kılınmalıdır.
* Milli kuvvetleri etkili, milli iradeyi etkin kılmak esastır.
*Manda ve himaye kabul edilemez.
Ancak gene Mustafa Kemal’in, 22 Haziran 1919’da Amasya Bildirgesi ile tüm dünyaya ilan ettiği "Ya İstikâl Ya Ölüm" şiarı, Türk milletinin "ne savaşarak, ne de savaşmadan esir düşmeyeceğinin" işaret fişeğidir.
1919’da bir takım ayrılıkçı cemiyetlerin (Mavr-i Mira, Kürt Teali, Rum Pontus vb gibi) yanı sıra aydın geçinen yazarların ve sözde düşünürlerin politize ettiği halkın büyük bir çoğunluğu "manda ve himaye"yi tek kurtuluş yolu olarak görmektedir.
Bir Wilson Prensipleri Cemiyeti- ki bu cemiyet tek kurtuluş olarak Amerikan mandacılığını görmektedir- Halide Edip, Refik Halit ve doktor, avukat, hariciyeci, yazar ve gazeteci devrin aydınları tarafından kurulmuştur.
Diğer taraftan ise, çoğu İngiliz Entellicens Servis’inin ajanı olan İngiliz Muhipleri Cemiyeti’nin üyeleri ve Saray, İngiliz himayesinin kabulü hakkında gerekli propagandayı yapmıştır.
Ancak Mustafa Kemal, bağımsızlıktan ve Türk milletinin kayıtsız şartsız egemenliğinden başka hiç bir şeyi kabul etmemiştir.
Daha sonra Mustafa Kemal Paşa’nın müthiş zekası harekete geçmiş, yaptığı hamlelerle müthiş ittifaklar sağlayarak özellikle Wilson Prensipleri Cemiyeti!’nin en güçlü savunucusunu, Halide Edip’i "Milli güçler"in safına katmıştır.
Üstelik Bağımsızlık Savaşı vahşi kapitalizme, emperyalizme ve içerideki işbirlikçilere karşı Mustafa Kemal’in, milli güçlerin ve halkın katılımıyla kazanılmıştır.
Örneğin Rus Devrimi’nde bir sınıfın önderliği göze çarpar. İşçi sınıfı… Bağımsızlık Savaşı, emperyalizme karşı mücadelesiyle, 1917 Rus Devrimi ile bir benzerlik göstermektedir. Ancak milli mücadele, milli burjuvazinin yanı sıra halkın katılımıyla başarıya ulaşmıştır.
Kemalist Devrim anti-kapitalist, anti-emperyalist bağımsızlıkçı bir halk ihtilâlidir.
29 Ekim 1923’te Mustafa Kemal dünyada bir kez daha hayata geçirilmesi mümkün olmayan bir devrimi gerçekleştirmiş ve bir ailenin 600 yıllık saltanatına son vermiştir. Bu demokratik devrimin adı Cumhuriyet’tir.
Ancak bundan sonraki süreç "kurtuluş ve kuruluş"tan çok daha zor ve engebelidir. Geçmişin izlerini ve köhnemişliğini henüz üzerinden atamamış kadrolar ve hâlâ halka tepeden bakan devlet ileri gelenleri ile yeni rejimin süregelmesi oldukça zordur.
O zaman bir ateş yakılmalı ve Kemalist (Milli) Devrim’in dinamizmi halka yansıtılmalıdır.
Bu süreci devrimlerin halka yansıması ve hayata geçirilmesi takip etmiştir.
Halk artık, Allah’ın yer yüzündeki gölgesi padişahın kulu değildir, yurttaştır. Türk milleti kaderine rıza gösteren, iradeden, azim ve karardan yoksun esarete çaresizce katlanan, bir topluluk değil, istiklâl-i tam bir ulus olacaktır.
Kemalist Düşünce’nin en önemli söylemi bağımsızlıkçılıktır. Atatürk’ün tüm ilke ve devrimleri bir bütün olarak, bağımsızlıkçılık düşüncesinin alt yapısını oluşturmaktadır. İstiklâl-i tam anlayışı tüm devrimleri korumaya almış dev bir şemsiyedir.
Mustafa Kemal’ce düşünmenin alfabesinin ilk dersi "Ya İstiklâl-Ya Ölüm"dür.
Bağımsızlıkçı olmadan Kemalist ve devrimci olunamaz.
İstiklâl-i tam bir ulus için Cumhuriyetçi, laik, halkçı, milliyetçi, devletçi ve DEVRİMCi olmak gerekmektedir.
Sınırsız, Seçkin, Sansürsüz, Kemalist Haber Blogu
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