Günlük arşivler: Eylül 2, 2012

CONFIDENTIAL – Anonymous and New York Times E-mail Leak Part 2


September 2, 2012 by Bernd Pulch

2 September 2012

Anonymous and New York Times E-mail Leak, Part Two #OpNYT

http://pastebin.com/DBLp5fa1

September 1, 2012

[redacted]: Hey [redacted]

me: yo

11:21 AM [redacted]: This Israel thing — was there an op this weekend, or did the websites actually just crash coincidentally?

me: there was a planned attack which was carried out

I spoke to Israeli TV about it

can provide recording if you’d like

[redacted]: Would you mind just telling me the same thing you told them?

11:22 AM Sorry, just easier that way.

me: Some Anons DDOSed Mossad, IDF sites after having put out press release

[redacted]: How many Anons?

me: no idea

[redacted]: Did they bring down the sites?

11:27 AM me: yes, that’s why the Israelis called me

11:28 AM [redacted]: Indeed. My question is — we know the sites went down, but do you definitively know the DDOS was responsible?

Also, can I use this on the record?

me: you may use on the record

if you agree to listen to the exchange I’ve had on this issue with Israeli TV

11:29 AM [redacted]: Sure, send the link.

me: which is brief and will bring you up to speed on necessary side issues

11:30 AM sending now

[redacted]: Thanks!

11:35 AM me: No problem. I just need to make sure that any coverage of this takes into account a comprehensive background since this relates to Mossad, others whom we’d prefer to have a clear view of this

11:37 AM [redacted]: Great, watching now.

11:47 AM [redacted]: So, essentially, you’re saying that it’s absurd for the ISraelis to claim the two things aren’t linked?

11:48 AM me: yes

[redacted]: Is it fair for me to say this:

an informal spokesman for Anonymous, said Monday that members of the group had carried out “a planned attack” on the Web sites in question. He called Israeli government’s claim of a coincidental hardware failure “absurd,” but could not provide specific details of the operation.”

11:50 AM me: except for last phrase. I can note that it was a DDOS attack and was warned about in prior messages

11:52 AM [redacted]: OK, but what I am trying to say is that you didn’t see any IRC activity, or numbers of people involved, or watch the sites go down under DDOS attack.

me: that’s a better way to put it

11:53 AM [redacted]: I can’t put it that way, because I’d have to explain every term and it would take 300 words.

How’s this?

an informal spokesman for Anonymous, said Monday that members of the group had carried out “a planned attack” on the Web sites in question. He called Israeli government’s claim of a coincidental hardware failure “absurd,” but did not have any direct evidence that the attack had brought down the sites.”

11:54 AM me: yep

[redacted]: Great, thanks [redacted]

[Barrett Brown of ProjectPM, informal Anon propagandist in 2011, trying to get NYT to cover Romas/COIN instead of just personalities of people who took the e-mails Romas/COIN comes from]

[redacted]-

At some point over the next few days I’ll be releasing details of a classified U.S. military surveillance program that until recently went by the name Romas/COIN and is which is to be replaced this year by a similar program known as Odyssey. This information has been accumulated via a great deal of research into the 71,000 HBGary e-mails as well as the overall probe of the intelligence contracting industry conducted by myself and a number of other parties with whom I’ve been working for the purpose of bringing scrutiny to this subject.

As my purpose is to ensure that this program receives the attention it merits, I’d like to provide The Times with the document in advance so that you may have a chance to verify that the above is indeed the case; you may, for instance, check the quotes I provide against the HBGary e-mails, which are still available online.

Thanks,

Barrett Brown

For at least two years, the U.S. has been conducting a secretive and immensely sophisticated campaign of mass surveillance and data mining against the Arab world, allowing the intelligence community to monitor the habits, conversations, and activity of millions of individuals at once. And with an upgrade scheduled for later this year, the top contender to win the federal contract and thus take over the program is a team of about a dozen companies which were brought together in large part by Aaron Barr – the same disgraced CEO who resigned from his own firm earlier this year after he was discovered to have planned a full-scale information war against political activists at the behest of corporate clients. The new revelation provides for a disturbing picture, particularly when viewed in a wider context. Unprecedented surveillance capabilities are being produced by an industry that works in secret on applications that are nonetheless funded by the American public – and which in some cases are used against that very same public. Their products are developed on demand for an intelligence community that is not subject to Congressional oversight and which has been repeatedly shown to have misused its existing powers in ways that violate U.S. law as well as American ideals. And with expanded intelligence capabilities by which to monitor Arab populations in ways that would have previously been impossible, those same intelligence agencies now have improved means by which to provide information on dissidents to those regional dictators viewed by the U.S. as strategic allies.

The nature and extent of the operation, which was known as Romas/COIN and which is scheduled for replacement sometime this year by a similar program known as Odyssey, may be determined in part by a close reading of hundreds of e-mails among the 70,000 that were stolen in February from the contracting firm HBGary Federal and its parent company HBGary. Other details may be gleaned by an examination of the various other firms and individuals that are discussed as being potential partners.

Of course, there are many in the U.S. that would prefer that such details not be revealed at all; such people tend to cite the amorphous and much-abused concept of “national security” as sufficient reason for the citizenry to stand idly by as an ever-expanding coalition of government agencies and semi-private corporations gain greater influence over U.S. foreign policy. That the last decade of foreign policy as practiced by such individuals has been an absolute disaster even by the admission of many of those who put it into place will not phase those who nonetheless believe that the citizenry should be prevented from knowing what is being done in its name and with its tax dollars.

To the extent that the actions of a government are divorced from the informed consent of those who pay for such actions, such a government is illegitimate. To the extent that power is concentrated in the hands of small groups of men who wield such power behind the scenes and without being accountable to the citizenry, there is no assurance that such power will be used in a manner that is compatible with the actual interests of that citizenry, or populations elsewhere. The known history of the U.S. intelligence community is comprised in large part of murder, assassinations, disinformation, the topping of democratic governments, the abuse of the rights of U.S. citizens, and a great number of other things that cannot even be defended on “national security” grounds insomuch as that many such actions have quite correctly turned entire populations against the U.S. government. This is not only my opinion, but also the opinion of countless individuals who once served in the intelligence community and have since come to criticize it and even unveil many of its secrets in an effort to alert the citizenry to what has been unleashed against the world in the name of “security.”

Likewise, I will here provide as much information as I can on Romas/COIN and its upcoming replacement.

***

Although the relatively well-known military contractor Northrop Grumman had long held the contract for Romas/COIN, such contracts are subject to regular recompetes by which other companies, or several working in tandem, can apply to take over. In early February, HBGary Federal CEO Aaron Barr wrote the following e-mail to Al Pisani, an executive at the much larger federal contractor TASC, a company which until recently had been owned by Northrop and which was now looking to compete with it for lucrative contracts:

“I met with [Mantech CEO] Bob Frisbie the other day to catch up. He is looking to expand a capability in IO related to the COIN re-compete but more for DoD. He told me he has a few acquisitions in the works that will increase his capability in this area. So just a thought that it might be worth a phone call to see if there is any synergy and strength between TASC and ManTech in this area. I think forming a team and response to compete against SAIC will be tough but doable.” IO in this context stands for “information operations,” while COIN itself, as noted in an NDA attached to one of the e-mails, stands for “counter intelligence. SAIC is a larger intelligence contractor that was expected to pursue the recompete as well.

Pisani agreed to the idea, and in conjunction with Barr and fellow TASC exec John Lovegrove, the growing party spent much of the next year working to create a partnership of firms capable of providing the “client” – a U.S. agency that is never specified in the hundreds of e-mails that follow – with capabilities that would outmatch those being provided by Northrop, SAIC, or other competitors.

Several e-mails in particular provide a great deal of material by which to determine the scope and intent of Romas/COIN. One that Barr wrote to his own e-mail account, likely for the purpose of adding to other documents later, is entitled “Notes on COIN.” It begins with a list of entries for various facets of the program, all of which are blank and were presumably filled out later: “ISP, Operations, Language/Culture, Media Development, Marketing and Advertising, Security, MOE.” Afterwards, another list consists of the following: “Capabilities, Mobile Development, Challenges, MOE, Infrastructure, Security.” Finally, a list of the following websites is composed, many of which represent various small companies that provide niche marketing services pursuant to mobile phones.

More helpful is a later e-mail from Lovegrove to Barr and some of his colleagues at TASC in which he announces the following:

Our team consists of:- TASC (PMO, creative services)

– HB Gary (Strategy, planning, PMO)

– Akamai (infrastructure)

– Archimedes Global (Specialized linguistics, strategy, planning)

– Acclaim Technical Services (specialized linguistics)

– Mission Essential Personnel (linguistic services)

– Cipher (strategy, planning operations)

– PointAbout (rapid mobile application development, list of strategic partners)

– Google (strategy, mobile application and platform development – long list of strategic partners)

– Apple (mobile and desktop platform, application assistance -long list of strategic partners)

We are trying to schedule an interview with ATT plus some other small app developers.

From these and dozens of other clues and references, the following may be determined about the nature of Romas/COIN:

Mobile phone software and applications constitute a major component of the program.

There’s discussion of bringing in a “gaming developer,” apparently at the behest of Barr, who mentions that the team could make good use of “a social gaming company maybe like zynga, gameloft, etc.” Lovegrove elsewhere notes: “I know a couple of small gaming companies at MIT that might fit the bill.”

Apple and Google were active team partners, and AT&T may have been as well. The latter is known to have provided the NSA free reign over customer communications (and was in turn protected by a bill granting them retroactive immunity from lawsuits). Google itself is the only company to have received a “Hostile to Privacy” rating from Privacy International. Apple is currently being investigated by Congress after the iPhone was revealed to compile user location data in a way that differs from other mobile phones; the company has claimed this to have been a “bug.”

The program makes use of several providers of “linguistic services.” At one point, the team discusses hiring a military-trained Arabic linguist. Elsewhere, Barr writes: “I feel confident I can get you a ringer for Farsi if they are still interested in Farsi (we need to find that out). These linguists are not only going to be developing new content but also meeting with folks, so they have to have native or near native proficiency and have to have the cultural relevance as well.”

Alterion and SocialEyez are listed as “businesses to contact.” The former specializes in “social media monitoring tools.” The latter uses “sophisticated natural language processing methodology” in order to “process tens of millions of multi-lingual conversations daily” while also employing “researchers and media analysts on the ground;” its website also notes that “Millions of people around the globe are now networked as never before – exchanging information and ideas, forming opinions, and speaking their minds about everything from politics to products.”

At one point, TASC exec Chris Clair asks Aaron and others, “Can we name COIN Saif? Saif is the sword an Arab executioner uses when they decapitate criminals. I can think of a few cool brands for this.”

A diagram attached to one of Barr’s e-mails to the group (http://imageshack.us/photo/my-images/7/pmo.png/) depicts Magpii as interacting in some unspecified manner with “Foreign Mobile” and “Foreign Web.” Magpii is a project of Barr’s own creation which stands for “Magnify Personal Identifying Information,” involves social networking, and is designed for the purpose of storing personal information on users. Although details are difficult to determine from references in Barr’s e-mails, he discusses the project almost exclusively with members of military intelligence to which he was pitching the idea.

There are sporadic references such things as “semantic analysis,” “Latent Semantic Indexing,” “specialized linguistics,” and OPS, a programming language designed for solving problems using expert systems.

Barr asks the team’s partner at Apple, Andy Kemp (whose signature lists him as being from the company’s Homeland Defense/National Programs division), to provide him “a contact at Pixar/Disney.”

Altogether, then, a successful bid for the relevant contract was seen to require the combined capabilities of perhaps a dozen firms – capabilities whereby millions of conversations can be monitored and automatically analyzed, whereby a wide range of personal data can be obtained and stored in secret, and whereby some unknown degree of information can be released to a given population through a variety of means and without any hint that the actual source is U.S. military intelligence. All this is merely in addition to whichever additional capabilities are not evident from the limited description available, with the program as a whole presumably being operated in conjunction with other surveillance and propaganda assets controlled by the U.S. and its partners.

Whatever the exact nature and scope of COIN, the firms that had been assembled for the purpose by Barr and TASC never got a chance to bid on the program’s recompete. In late September, Lovegrove noted to Barr and others that he’d spoken to the “CO [contracting officer] for COIN.” “The current procurement approach is cancelled [sic], she cited changed requirements,” he reported. “They will be coming out with some documents in a month or two, most likely an updated RFI [request for information]. There will be a procurement following soon after. We are on the list to receive all information.” On January 18th of next year, Lovegrove provided an update: “I just spoke to the group chief on the contracts side (Doug K). COIN has been replaced by a procurement called Odyssey. He says that it is in the formative stages and that something should be released this year. The contracting officer is Kim R. He believes that Jason is the COTR [contracting officer’s technical representative].” Another clue is provided in the ensuing discussion when a TASC executive asks, “Does Odyssey combine the Technology and Content pieces of the work?”

The unexpected change-up didn’t seem to phase the corporate partnership, which was still a top contender to compete for the upcoming Odyssey procurement. Later e-mails indicate a meeting between key members of the group and the contracting officer for Odyssey at a location noted as “HQ,” apparently for a briefing on requirements for the new program, on February 3rd of 2011. But two days after that meeting, the servers of HBGary and HBGary Federal were hacked by a small team of Anonymous operatives in retaliation for Barr’s boasts to Financial Times that he had identified the movement’s “leadership;” 70,000 e-mails were thereafter released onto the internet. Barr resigned a few weeks later.

Along with clues as to the nature of COIN and its scheduled replacement, a close study of the HBGary e-mails also provide reasons to be concerned with the fact that such things are being developed and deployed in the way that they are. In addition to being the driving force behind the COIN recompete, Barr was also at the center of a series of conspiracies by which his own company and two others hired out their collective capabilities for use by corporations that sought to destroy their political enemies by clandestine and dishonest means, some of which appear to be illegal. None of the companies involved have been investigated; a proposed Congressional inquiry was denied by the committee chair, noting that it was the Justice Department’s decision as to whether to investigate, even though it was the Justice Department itself that made the initial introductions. Those in the intelligence contracting industry who believe themselves above the law are entirely correct.

That such firms will continue to target the public with advanced information warfare capabilities on behalf of major corporations is by itself an extraordinary danger to mankind as a whole, particularly insomuch as that such capabilities are becoming more effective while remaining largely unknown outside of the intelligence industry. But a far greater danger is posed by the practice of arming small and unaccountable groups of state and military personnel with a set of tools by which to achieve better and better “situational awareness” on entire populations while also being able to manipulate the information flow in such a way as to deceive those same populations. The idea that such power can be wielded without being misused is contradicted by even a brief review of history.

History also demonstrates that the state will claim such powers as a necessity in fighting some considerable threat; the U.S. has defended its recent expansion of powers by claiming they will only be deployed to fight terrorism and will never be used against Ameerican civilians. This is cold comfort for those in the Arab world who are aware of the long history of U.S. material support for regimes they find convenient, including those of Saddam Hussein, Hosni Mubarak, and the House of Saud. Nor should Americans be comforted by such promises from a government that has no way of ensuring that they will be kept; it was just a few months ago that a U.S. general in Afghanistan ordered a military intelligence unit to use pysops on visiting senators in an effort to secure increased funding for the war; only a few days prior, CENTCOM spokesmen were confidently telling the public that such other psychological capabilities as persona management would never be used on Americans as that would be illegal. The fact is that such laws have been routinely broken by the military and intelligence community, who are now been joined in this practice by segments of the federal contracting industry.

It is inevitable, then, that such capabilities as form the backbone of Romas/COIN and its replacement Odyssey will be deployed against a growing segment of the world’s population. The powerful institutions that wield them will grow all the more powerful as they are provided better and better methods by which to monitor, deceive, and manipulate. The informed electorate upon which liberty depends will be increasingly misinformed. No tactical advantage conferred by the use of these programs can outweigh the damage that will be done to mankind in the process of creating them.

Hello [redacted], hope you’re well. This is potentially very interesting.

Do you have any official documentation — like government tenders, contracts, emails from DoD, State or intel agencies — you can send across? Likewise anything from Apple or Google.

No, I have no government documents of any sort, but there are additional details within the HBGary e-mails that may be relevant. I do have two recorded conversations with TASC execs John Lovegrove and Chris Clair in which they refuse to discuss the program, though.

Also, The Guardian will be running my announcement tomorrow on their website, and I’ll be linking to a copy of what I gave you, which will appear on my group’s wiki, here: http://wiki.echelon2.org/wiki/Main_Page

What’s the announcement? If it’s different from what you sent me earlier, can you send that too?

The announcement is merely an explanation of why this is significant; it will not contain any additional information about the subject.

Also, note that the NYT may verify and expand upon the info I’ll be providing by searching the HBGary e-mails by keyword: http://hbgary.anonleaks.ch/

Thanks!

Here’s that announcement:

http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/cifamerica/2011/jun/22/hacking-anonymous

Hey [redacted] — I was about to email you, actually. Can you send me your number? I’d like to call for a quick chat.

[redacted]

First off, here are a sampling of the e-mails upon which I’ve drawn. You can log onto our Gmail account where the entirety of Barr’s e-mails are located and search by keyword to verify and to see others. Just go to Gmail and use the following login info:

Login: Aaron.Barr

Password: hbgemail

Note that phone numbers for John Lovegrove and other people involved may be found in some of the e-mails I’ve pasted below.

I have also attached phone conversations I made to Chris Clair, one of the TASC execs involved in the discussions, as well as John Lovegrove, another TASC executive.

***

from Aaron Barr aaron@hbgary.com
to “Lovegrove, John (TASC)” <John.Lovegrove@tasc.com>
cc “Chris (TASC) Clair” <CHRISTOPHER.CLAIR@tasc.com>
date Wed, Mar 17, 2010 at 10:56 AM
subject Re: Antacid
mailed-by hbgary.com

hide details 3/17/10

I feel confident I can get you a ringer for Farsi if they are still interested in Farsi (we need to find that out).

I don’t know anything about Centra. Thing is with these organizations they like who they know. I never heard of Centra. What type of linguists do they have? Another tac might be to have a few stars on your side and don’t claim a deep bench of linguists (most of which are probably DoD trained and not at all native). You can ghost this talking about most linguists available are not native or digitally knowledgeable, but we have some stars and we are teaming with (someone like Gartner or Lincoln or Leoni) to bring some of the on the ground cultural relevance. These linguists are not only going to be developing new content but also meeting with folks, so they have to have native or near native proficiency and have to have the cultural relevance as well.

If Centra has this then I say grab them, if its just to fit a qual I think we could tell a different story and ghost the approach most will take to check the box. Gartner has an amazing presence overseas, they can help out with on the ground MOEs as well. Lincoln and Leoni have been working in those regions for quite some time linguistically and culturally.

Clair, Chris (TASC) CHRISTOPHER.CLAIR@tasc.com
to “Lovegrove, John (TASC)” <John.Lovegrove@tasc.com>,
“Garcia, Kathy (TASC)” <KATHERINE.GARCIA@tasc.com>,
Aaron Barr <aaron@hbgary.com>,
“Brunst Jr, Gerald R (TASC)” <GERALD.BRUNSTJR@tasc.com>,
“Newbern, David W (TASC)” <DAVID.NEWBERN@tasc.com>,
mgeldner@google.com
date Fri, Jul 2, 2010 at 12:58 PM
subject Google Meeting
mailed-by tasc.com

hide details 7/2/10

Title: Google Meeting

When: Wed Jul 14 1pm – 2pm (CDT)

Where: WF3 3D

Who: david.newbern@tasc.com, gerald.brunstjr@tasc.com, john.lovegrove@tasc.com, katherine.garcia@tasc.com…

Sign up for calendar »

Your Agenda for Wed Jul 14, 2010

No earlier events

1pm Google Meeting

No later events

view my calendar »

When: Wednesday, July 14, 2010 2:00 PM-3:00 PM (GMT-05:00) Eastern Time (US & Canada).

Where: WF3 3D

Note: The GMT offset above does not reflect daylight saving time adjustments.

*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*

Meeting with Mike Geldner from Google.

Mike,

Our address is

TASC Inc.

4801 Stonecroft Blvd. , Chantilly, VA 20151

My contact number is 703-449-3964.

We will talk about Google Enterprise Partners and other things Google that are important to the COIN proposal.

Thanks,

Chris Clair

Public Intelligence – CONFIDENTIAL – DoD Science and Technology Strategic Communication/Social Media Programs


The following lists contain basic information on current, ongoing, and planned Department of Defense Science and Technology Strategic Communication (SC) programs. The list from 2009 was taken from the 2009 Strategic Communication Science and Technology Plan compiled by the Defense Research and Engineering Rapid Reaction Technology Office. The 2012 list was taken from the Science and Technology for Communication and Persuasion Abroad Gap Analysis and Survey compiled by Will McCants of the Center for Naval Analyses.

Program Categories

I Infrastructure Enabling and facilitating access to information from news to markets to vocational
S Social Media Knowledge Management, Social Media, and Virtual Worlds
D Discourse Analysis of radical and counter‐radical messages and ideas
M Modeling and Forecasting Gaming and anticipating adversarial messages and ideas activities and our counters and pre‐emptives
C Collaboration Increasing collaboration and training across and beyond Government
F First Three Feet Empowering, Equipping, Educating, and Encouraging media and others to exist and freely report on events for what they really are
U Understanding Develop country, culture, and regional expertise, including polling
P Psych Defense Planning and capacity building for dealing with critical strains on society in peacetime and wartime

Projects as of March 2012

Project Name Description Execution Agent
C Return on Investment Analytic Framework for COCOM VOICE Operations The contractor shall develop one or more Return on Investment Analytic Frameworks for the COCOM Voice Operations. These frameworks shall provide measurements of performance, measurements of effectiveness, and methods of determining overall return on investment of program dollars. Deliverables include: 1) an analysis plan; 2) development of a semistructured instrument to assist in Stakeholder interviews; 3) a summary report with a literature review; a final report / final analysis frameworks/scorecards; and 4) development of a training manual and slide presentation detailing the application of its ROI framework(s). ASD(SO/LIC)-
CTTSO
C Population Research and Analysis Planning Support to Military Information Support Operations The contractor shall design and execute a graduated research training course for the Department of Defense designed to be taught in an incremental fashion, over an extended period of time. As many as six courses of training are desired to teach advanced, senior, and (as an option) master approaches to the methodological design and interpretation of public opinion polling, focus groups, in-depth interviews, media analysis and general analytical concepts associated with evaluation. Additionally, the courses shall highlight examples of the types of situations where each approach is most useful. ASD(SO/LIC)-
CTTSO
C Tanzania Terror Conference Four day conference to bring African Partners to discuss and cross-talk about CVEI initiatives and problems USAFRICOM
C Embassy Dhaka Countering Violent Extremism Conference The conference’s objective is to discuss and identify Countering Violent Extremism strategic communication objectives for counter-radicalization. Mission Dhaka requests action posts to nominate host nation participants for the conference. Each delegation will present a case study on the counterradicalization methods, policies and programs used in their respective country. The United States’ Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program (CTFP) is fully sponsoring seventy-five participants from Bangladesh, India, Maldives, Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Thailand to participate in this conference. AMEMB Dhaka OASD-SOLIC CTFP
C Multi-lateral Planners Conference VII This conference is co-sponsored by JS J5 and the Australian Defense Force. The conference will contain a series of four break-out sessions, focused on CVE, Addressing Resources Scarcity, Examining the Role of Multi-national Institutions, and Addressing the New Global Commons. Joint Staff J5, Australian Defense Force
D RED BEARD Translation and exploitation of AQA internal correspondence for use by US and foreign nation CT forces; Counter AQA propaganda USSOCOM
D Metaphor Program The Metaphor Program will exploit the fact that metaphors are pervasive in everyday talk and reveal the underlying beliefs and worldviews of members of a culture. In the first phase of the two-phase program, performers will develop automated tools and techniques for recognizing, defining and categorizing linguistic metaphors associated with target concepts and found in large amounts of native language text. The resulting conceptual metaphors will be validated using empirical social science methods. In the second phase, the program will characterize differing cultural perspectives associated with case studies of the types of interest to the Intelligence Community. Performers will apply the methodology established in the first phase and will identify the conceptual metaphors used by the various protagonists, organizing and structuring them to reveal the contrastive stances. IARPA
F Leaders of Influence – Maldives This is a counter-radicalization series of seminars, workshops, and discussions facilitated by the Asia Foundation, incorporating religious and secular leaders in the Maldives to advocate moderate religious messages tolerance of dissenting views and non-violent expressions of faith. The series will also serve to discredit violent extremist ideology. Additionally, the series will establish a network of new key communicators and contacts for future programs. USSOCOM
I Operation PALISADES Op Palisades Cell Towers to ensure 24×7 availability USCENTCOM of cellular service to Afghans, commencing in RCSOUTH USCENTCOM
I Public Command Message Translation Website The USPACOM website and public pages to include selected third party media content translated, culturally optimized, and updated daily in the languages of Japanese, Chinese (Mandarin), Indonesian (Bahasa), Korean, Indian (Hindu), Vietnamese, Mongolian and Thai. This capability provides blogging and interactive, public communication capabilities utilizing existing social media and network sites like Facebook, Flickr, and Twitter or other regional web applications. USPACOM
I Regional Magazine Initiative (RMI) – Multiple / Worldwide USSOCOM develops a centrallymanaged magazine architecture within which participating COCOM magazines tailored to foreign audiences can operate in order to amplify their transregional impact, achieve cost efficiencies and enhance quality. USSOCOM
I Trans Regional Web Initiative (TRWI) – Multiple / Worldwide USSOCOM develops a centrallymanaged website architecture within which participating COCOM websites tailored to foreign audiences can operate in order to amplify their transregional impact, achieve cost efficiencies and enhance quality. USSOCOM
I Center for Strategie Counterterrorism Communications (CSCC) An Executive Order established the CSCC in FY 11. The goal of the interagency center is synchronizing the USG’s CT and CVE communications. DOS
I Real-Time Contextual Mapping and Visualization Dashboard for Muslim Social
Movements
A web portal that provides access to a broad range of information. This will include a database that tracks both radical and counter-radical networks of ideas and actors. The web portal’s dashboard will graphically map the diffusion and influence, geographically and diachronically, of these ideas and actors. The dashboard will feature the ability to search and return results which include descriptive information about and classification of the search terms and constructs; a visual representation of where along multiple spectrums any particular group lies at a defined period of time based on the project’s analysis of multi-faceted crossregional and cross-disciplinary data using theoretically driven non-binary models which capture the complexity of the material; the ability to track peaking religious, political, socioeconomic markers driving Muslim social movements, their target demographics, and locations. ASD(R&E)-
Minerva
I Babel Program The Babel Program will develop agile and robust speech recognition technology that can be rapidly applied to any human language in order to provide effective search capability for analysts to efficiently process massive amounts of real-world recorded speech. Today’s transcription systems are built on technology that was originally developed for English, with markedly lower performance on non-English languages. These systems have often taken years to develop and cover only a small subset of the languages of the world. Babel intends to demonstrate the ability to generate a speech transcription system for any new language within one week to support keyword search performance for effective triage of massive amounts of speech recorded in challenging realworld situations. IARPA
M Influencing Violent Extremist Organizations Update The objective of the I-VEO project was to gain a holistic understanding of intended and unintended effects of Influencing Violent Extremist Organizations (IVEO) that can be transferred to a usable analytic framework that informed decisionmakers and planners. The resulting holistic analyses derived analytic confidence from the examination of sound theoretical knowledge, conceptual modeling, and testing in historical cases. The results of this study aided the Joint Staff and COCOMs at strategic and operational levels by providing a conceptual framework grounded in scientifically-sound theoretical concepts and analyses. ASD(R&E)-Strategic Multilayer
Assessment
M Early Warning, Analysis and Targeting for Hotspot Identification, Tracking and Intervention Sandia National Laboratories will pilot the use of its suite of graph, text, and web analytics to identify locations, websites, groups and individuals where social mobilization and flare ups are most likely to occur. Primarily using open-source information from the web, Sandia will identify and map relevant social and information networks, determine their virulence and effectiveness, map current influence flows and effects, and identify opportunities and candidate means for positive change. ASD(R&E)-Rapid Reaction
Technology Office, USPACOM, SOCPAC
M Sirius Program The goal of the Sirius Program is to create experimental Serious Games to train participants and measure their proficiency in recognizing and mitigating the cognitive biases that commonly affect all types of intelligence analysis. The research objective is to experimentally manipulate variables in Serious Games and to determine whether and how such variables might enable playerparticipant recognition and persistent mitigation of cognitive biases. The Program will provide a basis for experimental repeatability and independent validation of effects, and identify critical elements of design for effective analytic training in Serious Games. The cognitive biases of interest that will be examined include: (1) Confirmation Bias, (2) Fundamental Attribution Error, (3) Bias Blind Spot, (4) Anchoring Bias, (5) Representativeness Bias, and (6) Projection Bias. IARPA
P IO Subject Matter Expert Exchange – Mexico IO subject matter expert Exchange requested by SEDENA and SEMAR (Mexican Military) to provide information about Information Operations in general and certain IO capabilities within stated Mexican military capabilities in September 2011 USSOUTHCOM
S Knowledge Management Cell Provides timely and relevant cultural advisement to USCENTCOM on-going planning efforts and current events. Maintains a Common Operating Picture with database for IO related operations, actions, and activities USCENTCOM
S Social Media in Strategic Communication The general goal of the Social Media in Strategic Communication (SMISC) program is to develop a new science of social networks built on an emerging technology base. In particular, SMISC will develop automated and semiautomated operator support tools and techniques for the systematic and methodical use of social media at data scale and in a timely fashion to accomplish four specific program goals:
1. Detect, classify, measure and track the (a) formation, development and spread of ideas and concepts (memes), and (b) purposeful or deceptive messaging and misinformation. 2. Recognize persuasion campaign structures and influence operations across social media sites and communities. 3. Identify participants and intent, and measure effects of persuasion campaigns. 4. Counter messaging of detected adversary influence operations.
DARPA
U Global Assessment Program (GAP) The Global Assessment Program (GAP) supports Military Information Support Operations (MISO) products for USSOCOM and the Geographic Combatant Commands in Overseas Contingency Operations. The program:
* Plans, develops, organizes, coordinates and analyzes relevant qualitative research, statistically reliable and valid quantitative research, and testing and polling activities at the local, provincial, national, and regional levels based upon USSOCOM designated objectives.
* Annually, collects geo-located data, both qualitative and quantitative, that relates to the performance and effects of existing influence activities in each country specified by the Government. Sample sizes shall be sufficiently large enough to enable the Government to use the province as the smallest unit of analysis.
* Applies current research and sociocultural explanations of radicalization and violent extremism to understand the effectiveness of human influence, media communications and engagement operations and activities in achieving United States Government and Department of Defense (DoD) objectives.
* Determines the population’s sympathy/antipathy for al-Qaida (AQ) and its allies’ methods and rationales for radicalization, recruitment and propensity for violence at the provincial level (or country equivalent); as well as, assesses and defines the reasons for their sympathy/antipathy and their valid human factors influence requirements.
* Uses time-series analyses, predictive modeling, and statistical matching techniques (e.g., propensity scoring) and geospatial analysis to discern the impact of military information support operations program initiatives.
* Assesses the efficacy of influence programs delivered using a variety of media including printed materials, webbased content, television and radio.
* Using a combination of qualitative and quantitative methodologies, assesses the effectiveness and synchronization of content across transregional products covering each Geographic Combatant Command’s area of responsibility.
* Assesses the effectiveness of regionally and trans-regionally oriented web-based influence programs. Assessments of content synchronization and effectiveness shall be conducted annually for each website and/or webbased initiative.
USSOCOM
U Internet Service Translation of local and satellite news to analyze USCENTCOM Iraq area of operations events, and provided advice to the J33 IO USCENTCOM
U Focus Group and Polling Polling is conducted for long term trends and analysis of the environment. Focus Groups are conducted to pretest brand products, significant changes in the environment, and other cultural or topical issues. USCENTCOM
U Baseline Assessment of MISO Effects in Mexico Develop initial Mexico information environment baseline. Identify influence control factors to apply MISO effects. Understand threat actors in area of operations, C-Trans-National Crime Organization and counterterrorism. Understand the use of social media and monitor influence and effects on threat, government, population, and green forces. USSOUTHCOM
U OPERATION Reliant Voice Assessment Manage Operation RELIANT VOICE (ORV) influence assessment effort. Intent is to synchronize all ORV assessment processes; augmented with assessment subject matter experts to deliver an integrated, efficient and effective report detailing execution and impact of all ORV operations, activities, and actions. USPACOM
U Research and Analysis of Nepal Security Environment Determine factors in Nepal that contribute to a fragile security environment and how SOCPAC can influence those factors in future operations USPACOM
U Vulnerable Population Study (VPS) A series of targeted/random assessments to identify USSOCOM (VPS) population groups vulnerable to religious radicalization, extremist recruitment and illicit activities (smuggling, piracy, trafficking) in order to develop information on potential target audiences for future MIST-BG programs, and gauge changes in perception over time. USSOCOM
U Gather Information – Thailand The MIST will employ independent contractors, through the Open Source Center, for the collection of information on past and current MISO programs, violent extremist ideology messaging, and atmospherics of the operating environment. USSOCOM
U Designing a Qualitative Data Collection Strategy for Africa The Institute for Defense Analyses will survey the qualitative data requirements among USG designers and users of computational models relating to Africa. In addition to interviews with individual stakeholders, IDA will convene a workshop of the USG modeling and simulation community to identify existing tools, models, and simulations currently being used to inform analyses of the African continent; data categories, fields, and other types of data currently collected; sources of existing qualitative data; sampling methodologies; gaps in qualitative data; and evaluate the quality of data currently collected and gauge interest/need to validate data. IDA will then work closely with the sponsor, other USG stakeholders, and key regional participants and partner institutions to develop a qualitative data collection strategy. ASD(R&E)-Rapid
Reaction
Technology
Office
U Open Source
Indicators
Many significant societal events are preceded and/or followed by population-level changes in communication, consumption, and movement. Some of these changes may be indirectly observable from publicly available data, such as web search queries, blogs, micro-blogs, internet traffic, financial markets, traffic webcams, Wikipedia edits, and many others. Published research has found that some of these data sources are individually useful in the early detection of events such as disease outbreaks. But few methods have been developed for anticipating or detecting unexpected events by fusing publicly available data of multiple types from multiple sources. IARPA’s Open Source Indicators (OSI) Program aims to fill this gap by developing methods for continuous, automated analysis of publicly available data in order to anticipate and/or detect significant societal events, such as political crises, humanitarian crises, mass violence, riots, mass migrations, disease outbreaks, economic instability, resource shortages, and responses to natural disasters. Performers will be evaluated on the basis of warnings that they deliver about real-world events. IARPA

Projects as of April 2009

Project Name Description Execution Agent
C Deployable Interagency Planning Augmentation Cell (DIPAC) The short-term objective of DIPAC is to develop regional interagency strategic communication campaign plans that support Chief of Mission Priorities and more effectively coordinate DOD, COCOM and Embassy planning, programming and resourcing. The long-term objective is to lay the foundation for regional resourcing for strategic communication, based on regionalization of the Long War and coordinated through the Department of State/Counterterrorisms (S/CT) Regional Strategic Initiatives (RSI). The DIPAC will provide a common strategic communication planning construct, compare cost-benefit of diverse programs and leverage USG resources more effectively to gain unity of effort. Department of State/Counter- Terrorism
C VOICEBOX Operational analysis and capability design of future state SC enterprise for US Government SO/LIC Irregular Warfare Support (IWS) Office/Booz- Allen
C SC Training Providing COCOM planners and DoD representatives to U.S. country teams with appropriate training in SC, public affairs, information operations, and defense support to PD OSD/Policy/ Office of
Partnership Strategy
D Islamic rhetoric and ideological framework to
counter adversary
IO capability
Develop analytical tools and models to monitor, counter, anticipate and assess the effectiveness of adversary information operations
D Adversarial
Information Flow
(Proof of Concept)
Measures how adversary information moves from one network to another Joint Staff
J-39
D Finding Allies in the
War of Words: Mapping the Diffusion and
Influence of Counter-Radical Muslim Discourse
An on-going Policy effort to better coordinate DoD institutionalization of social science that aims to improve our understanding of foreign area populations. Minerva (DDR&E/OSD/ Policy) Arizona State University
D Emotion and Intergroup Relations An on-going Policy effort to better coordinate DoD institutionalization of social science that aims to improve our understanding of foreign area populations. Minerva (DDR&E/OSD/ Policy) San Francisco State University
D ECHOES: Identifying and Enabling Circulation of Constructive Media for Countering Violent Extremism ECHOES identifies and circulates indigenous media that offer alternative ideas to extremists propaganda but is not
well circulated. ECHOES builds a repository of constructive media
predominantly, but not exclusively, by Muslims, providing a shared tools to counter violent extremist influence for use
by USG, foreign partners, and private sector. Enabling the circulation of constructive media in key foreign audiences
undermines support for, and conversion to, violent extremism, fosters positive alternatives, and builds a market for Muslim CVE media. ECHOES will be comprised of three major projects, detailed below.
OSD/Policy/ Support to Public
Diplomacy (SPD)
D Echoes Children’s
Arabic Media
This project focuses on understanding and finding resources for prevention of radicalization among Arab children. The researchers, specialists in childrens education and Arabic, will identify the key criteria appropriate for children in prevention of radicalization, find Arabic media for children which meet these criteria, and provide copies of the media to the DoD funded counter-radicalization media repository at the University of Maryland (UMDD). The researchers will include this information in an unclassified database of the UMD repository. OSD/Policy SPD
D Echoes Repository at University of Maryland This will fund library cataloging of counter- radicalization media to support growth of the counter-radicalization media repository under development by the University of Maryland (UMDD) National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). Build a multi-language, multi-cultural, publicly accessible clearing house of counter-radicalization media. OSD/Policy SPD
D Echoes in DoD Educational Institutions OSD/OUSD(P)/Support to Public Diplomacy (SPD) will provide to DoD PME 8 books (non-fiction and fiction) and 4 films by Muslims which counter ideological support terrorism (CIST) for use in CIST education, along with Introductory Guides for the 8 books and 4 films. International Media Ventures will handle translation and development of teaching guides, and SOCOM J239 will deliver items to US military educational institutions and
socialize the materials. Make insightful, informative Arabic and Urdu media by Muslims which undermine support for
violent extremism available to US military in English. Improve our US military capacity for CIST and cultural understanding.
OSD/Policy SPD
D CM Youth
Technology Corps
Develop new media strategies for use against online extremist propaganda SO/LIC IWS/Harvard
Berkman Center
D CM English
Language Gaming
Develop mobile phone and downloadable games using English language to promote deradicalization SO/LIC IWS/USC and
Electronic Arts
D RAND Alternative
Strategies
To facilitate the networking of women activists in Iraq and Afghanistan at different stages of development as key lever(s) to combat extremism and sectarian strife in these two conflict zones RAND
D Brand Switching for Counter-Marketing Operations The purpose of this task is to conduct an operational analysis of the capability to rapidly and dynamically channel message resonators that will mitigate, eviscerate and mute the perspective of Islamist radical and insurgent thought by providing broader enveloping logic and creative interpretations that are supported by legitimate alternative intellectual resources. This analysis will result in a capability design that will build upon brand switching methodologies identified in the analysis and create a perpetual capability to perform counter-marketing operations across the spectrum of adversary influence. Phase 2 of the project includes a pilot program to implement the approved methodology. SO/LIC/CTTSO/ IWS
D RAND Provision of
Social Services
Study how radical Islamic organizations use social services to develop popular support RAND
D Kefaya Study Study democratic grass roots movement in
MENA and document lessons learned
RAND
D MCIA Cultural Red
Cell
Develop red team of al-Anbaris to develop vignettes for USMC UCI
D JIEDDO S&T: Attack the network Develop of counter-narrative information operations in Afghanistan. Identify insurgent discourse on IEDs. JIEDDO
F Victims of al-Qaeda
Documentary
Production of film documentary of 9/11 victims’ families reaching out to families of al-Qaeda victims in MENA countries SO/LIC/CTTSO/ IWS and
State Department
I Navy Expeditionary Transmission System IP based video and data transmission hub for Dept of Navy Office of Information. Hub or Head-end infrastructure will support fleet public affairs efforts to move large amounts of video data for further dissemination internally and externally. Hub will provide the capability for Navy to conduct live transmissions from around the globe 24-7, afloat and ashore. Navy CHINFO
I Digital Photo Lab Electronic imaging capability aboard Navy CVNs with still and motion imagery processing and editing software coupled with ship’s communication suite to transmit Public Affairs and other visual communication products from ship to shore. Current system is configure with one still imagery work station and one motion media work station, one small format color printer and one large format color printer. Navy CHINFO
I VOCUS Provides detailed media review and analysis, news media contact management and video clip distribution. Navy CHINFO
I Navy Public Affairs
Calendar
A software solution to maintain global awareness of significant events, leadership engagement, significant fleet activities, public outreach events, media engagement and other key events in order to align and maximize return on investment for the Navys communication efforts. Navy CHINFO
I Media Lighthouse Digital Asset Management System System provides a centrally managed collection of still photography, video, breaking news features, and topic specific categories to assist print, broadcast, and web based outlets requiring 24/7 access to current events throughout the U.S. Navy. Navy CHINFO
I TVEyes Broadcast Monitoring Service On-line search, edit, and retrieval of broadcast media programming form 140 national and international media outlets. Navy CHINFO
I Network exploitation and analysis Identify and exploit means to counter or intercept insurgent use of modern communications technologies
I Afghan Virtual
Science Library
The pilot Afghanistan Virtual Science Library at Kabul University will offer scientists and engineers access to international scientific, engineering, and technical journals and professional resources. Based on this pilot, CRDF will develop a plan and proposal to extend capacity to other universities and to Afghan government ministries. State/CRDF
M Naval Postgraduate School Information Operations Threat This project will support special operations units currently deployed in Afghanistan (OEF) by delivering fully developed IO plans, assisting units to implement these plans, and measuring the effectiveness of the plans and recommend appropriate adjustments Naval Postgraduate School
(NPS)
M Interagency Gaming
Exercise
In cooperation with DDRE/RRTO, JFCOM and the FBI, a series of inter-agency gaming exercises will be conducted to test the collaborative environment in using data from a variety of sources, among which are models produced from the social sciences. Part of the gaming exercises will include actual data, based on perceptions of local conditions and factors contributing to radicalism.

The Gallup GLASS and POLRAD models can be used as a valuable addition to the simulations, in order to help guide decision making based on actual data. When necessary, simulated data sets will also be created to fit specific scenarios, but as much as possible, the data will be based on actual survey results from the World Poll or other sources. Gallup will also participate in development of the exercises and provide reach back support.

OSD/AT&L/ DDR&E/Rapid Reaction Technology Office (RRTO)/ Strategic Multi-layer Assessment (SMA) and Gallup
M Cooperative
Security Pilot
As Secretary Gates suggests, the best way to combat the current threat environment is through a combination of soft and hard power. CSP will provide the Operational Commander an increased capability to 1) understand the root causes of conflict through a broad-based assessment tool, 2) develop integrated, cogent, foundational plans that are based on best practices garnered through experience, and 3) measure the effect of interagency, and international, stability and reconstruction efforts in support of strategic objectives efforts aimed at reducing the drivers of conflict and strengthening institutional performance of the target state or region. The capability, including associated methodologies, data integration and analysis, will be demonstrated in-theater (such as Afghanistan, Kosovo, Philippines (PI) and/or a venue in Southcoms AOR) with COCOM guidance and the products enable the comprehensive synchronization and monitoring of Joint, Interagency, and Multinational efforts that accommodates the needs of the Diplomacy, Defense and Development communities. US Army Corps of Engineers
(USACE)
M Initial Steps to Operationalize Analysis of Discourse Accent and Discursive Practices for Indications & Warnings (I&W) The objective of this effort is to identify a set
of leading cues/indicators of adversary action based on analysis of discourse accent and discursive practices, develop a methodology to detect/extract/exploit these cues/indicators and identify existing or modified tools to operationalize the methodology. This effort will employ a multi-disciplinary approach (including anthropology, linguistics, computational modeling), supported by government and industry analysts and technical experts with advanced degrees in both the physical and social sciences and augmented by selective groups of academic consultants. The end customer is envisioned to be the NASIC and other members of the analyst community. The payoff is the operationalization of a (indirect sensing) method to detect leading indicators of an action/event, and ultimately of increasing radicalization, far in advance of methods that rely on direct sensing.
M Technology Initiatives for Improving Non- Kinetic Capabilities for Irregular Warfare Emerging threats have created the need for an expanded toolkit of non-kinetic capabilities that will enable the warfighter to tailor an approach for any given set of conditions. This effort will identify needed non-kinetic capabilities and directions for technology initiatives that could support them. Non-kinetic capabilities evaluated include: Influencing the Population; Unity of Effort in Civil-Military Actions; Countering Corruption in Host Nation Police Forces; and Vehicle Identification and Tracking. OSD/AT&L/ DDR&E/RRTO/ Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA)
M Development of SENSE Capability for Inter-
Agency/International
Collaboration
The United States Institute of Peace (USIP) will facilitate the development of training environments for Inter-Agency/International collaboration based upon SENSE technology. The objectives of this project are: (1) to train individuals (both civilians and uniformed military/host-nation and international) in SENSE to enable them to collaborate and cooperate more successfully in conflict prevention, humanitarian assistance/disaster relief, stability, and post-conflict reconstruction operations; and (2) to expand the base of institutions which can help develop and deliver simulations. The payoff is a multiplier effect: there will be an increased number of individuals trained to more effectively operate in these operations and the simulation events will provide the opportunity to develop a new simulation based upon the SENSE architecture OSD/AT&L/ DDR&E/RRTO/ IDA and US Institute for Peace (USIP)
P Domestic
Communications
Methodologies Post- Catastrophe
Responds to a domestic catastrophic event such as a major hurricane or the detonation of a WMD OASD (HD&ASA)
P Low tech mass
communications capability — NORTHCOM’s Civil Support Information Support Element (CAISE).
CAISE produces and disseminates critical emergency information during a humanitarian crisis OASD (HD&ASA)
S Support to Common Operating Picture (SCOPe) Knowledge Management of unclassified information to counter ideological support to terrorism and violent extremism. SCOPe is a DoD-funded initiative, currently being led by NCTC/ DSOP, to identify, connect, and maintain a COP of all USG CVE programs. It is comprised of two efforts: LENS (Linking Essentials in National Security) and MAP (Mission Awareness Program). National Counter Terrorism Center (NCTC), as well as OSD/Policy Support to Public Diplomacy, HTT, and National Media Exploitation Center (NMEC)
S Comprehensive
Voice Series
Provides a cross-GCC Data Sharing Warehouse of Human and Social Network Nodal and Audience Data for influence operations Joint Staff
J-39
S Afghan COIN Web
Portal
To expand and develop ongoing research and dissemination of socio-cultural / human terrain information on Afghanistan via an open-source web portal: http://www.nps.edu/programs/ccs. Provide comprehensive assessments of tribal and clan networks in coordination with ongoing COIN operations and needs. Supply deployed forces with accurate information in a timely manner via our web portal and Requests for Information (RFI). Naval Postgraduate School
(NPS)
S Regional Engagement Plan/Counter-Motivation CMB1 includes several unfunded requirements from State Departments Policy Planning Staff. These UFRs address core public diplomacy problems in countering ideological support to terrorism, youth engagement, and radicalization prevention. The execution of this program will deploy several independent programs into conflict regions using the latest advances in social media and networking technology. Youth Technology Core: Teams of IT-savvy Harvard students recruited to develop and promulgate code for a variety of social networking sites. Deliverables will span from simple applications for existing networks (Facebook) to all-new platforms with associated code. English Language Gaming: Tailorable and marketable games that teach the user English language, customs and culture. One game will be produced for deployment on the $100 Laptop project and another will be produced exclusively for mobile device usage (cell phones, smart phones, etc.). SO/LIC/CTTSO/ IWS
S Ontology-Based
Deductive Database for the Institute for
the Study of Violent
Groups (ISVG)
Provides a database access for warfighters to information on violent groups and criminal activity. OSD/AT&L/DDR&E/RRTO/ OntologyWorks
S Self-organizing
Groups Study
Research and analysis of the phenomenology of self-organizing systems in virtual media OSD/The Rendon Group
S Reaching Foreign Audiences through Non-Traditional Media Improving volume and penetration of DoD messages to domestic and foreign audiences through the non-traditional means such as: streaming web, podcast, blogs, cell phones, digital broadcast, emerging technologies, etc. OSD/Policy/ Building
Partnership (BP)
U Foreign Analysis The objective of this project is to provide strategic decision makers critical information about a foreign country and how it affects United States policy in the Middle East. The payoff will be detailed reporting on foreign and regional elites opinions on that countrys policies; additionally, the project will provide a detailed assessment of foreign elites reactions to U.S. actions and policies within the region. Finally, the project will provide additional tools for better understanding the foreign country. Jt. Staff
U Foreign Audience
Perceptions
COCOMs will incorporate understanding of foreign audiences and simulation of BP activities and effects into wargames and exercises OSD/Policy/BP
D Credible Muslim
Voices
The Joint Information Operations Warfare Command (JIOWC) in coordination with Special Operations Command, CIA, National Counter Terrorism Center, Joint Staff, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense is working to identify, catalogue, characterize, and reach out to Credible Muslim Voices. Joint Information Operations Warfare Command (JIOWC) with SOCOM, CIA, NCTC, Jt.Staff, OSD
F Foreign Media
Analysis
The JIOWC via USSTRATCOM has a foreign media analysis contract that acts as target audience analysis as well as an indicator and warning function. JIOWC/ USSTRATCOM
M Effectiveness of Psychological Influence Calculator (EPIC) The Effectiveness of Psychological Influence Calculator (EPIC) provides an analytical tool for predicting the effectiveness of PSYOP strategies. EPIC is based on the initial analytical framework provided by the Psychological Operations (PSYOP) Joint Munitions Effectiveness Manual (JMEM) Functional Area Working Group of the Joint Technical Group for Munitions Effectiveness (JTCG/ME). EPIC evaluates PSYOP products with four primary factors; distribution, dissemination, reception, and accessibility. Further, EPIC provides a logic mechanism to aggregate the effects of numerous products supporting a Series, the strength of the argument or line of persuasion presented through the products, and the effectiveness of the Target Audience to accomplish a Supporting PSYOP Objective (SPO). USSOCOM/J39 and
USSTRATCOM
D Data Mining and Semantic Analysis for on-line Media Preliminary research and a proof of concept has been conducted by DoD’s Information Operations Task Force on the use of semantic analysis programming to detect trends and the frequency of appearance of specific themes in on-line media. The capability can provide a broad representation of country and region attitudes and trends on issues of DoD and USG interest. USD(I)
C Joint Socio-Cultural Operational Understanding of the Terrain (J- SCOUT) Developed a concept with JS/J-3/DDGO for a cross cutting, multidisciplinary approach to Joint and Interagency Operations in Socio-Cultural terrain. It addresses the issues and hurdles in transitioning socio- cultural capabilities to COCOMs. The technical and the enabling information infrastructure requirements are identified. OSD/AT&L/ DDR&E/RRTO/ SMA/ Joint Staff
M Measuring Progress in Conflict Environments (MPICE) The MPICE system was developed to provide a basic metrics analysis capability suitable for broad interagency use applicable to any stabilization and reconstruction environment of interest. The system was developed in part through case study application in Afghanistan and Sudan, and is being employed in support of the U.S. State Department Haiti Stabilization Initiative (HSI). The system can be used both as an organizing guide for policy makers and planners, as well as a comprehensive means to analyze progress across sectors over time. The tool allows users to develop a visual story with flexibility to adapt to their particular needs. OSD/AT&L/DDR&E/RRTO/US Army Corps of Engineers/
U.S. State Department
C Transitional Law
Enforcement (TLE)
The TLE project will advance current thinking on the nature of, and need for, law enforcement capability across DoD, the Services and the interagency to support complex warfighting, conflict resolution, stabilization and reconstruction. The project will first define deployable law enforcement capabilities in terms of the full spectrum of organizational and conceptual changes required to be relevant, practical and realistic for the US military and interagency. The project will establish the relationships, operational and organizational models and the body of knowledge about past operations/practices that will be a prerequisite to developing a functioning capability in the future. The body of knowledge will cover strategic and operational level issues as well as analysis of the use of the various technologies required to best implement this capability. OSD/AT&L/DDR&E/RRTO/ Emerging Capabilities
C STARTIDES Civil and military public private partnership acting as a network organization to better respond to humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, stability operations, and finding sustainable solutions for stressed populations. Major components are social networking; capturing knowledge of cheap, sustainable emergency response gadgets; reshaping policy in stabilization and reconstruction; and coordinating, collaborating better interagency efforts in an efficient and self-organizing manner. National Defense University, Center of Technology and National Security

CONFIDENTIAL – USA v Apple et al E-Book Proposed Final Judgment


USA v Apple et al E-Book Proposed Final Judgment.pdf

CONFIDENTIAL – DoD Science and Technology for Communication and Persuasion Abroad Analysis


DoD Science and Technology for Communication and Persuasion Abroad Analysis.pdf

Public Intelligence – Survey Finds U.S. Soldiers Believe the Afg han Army is Making Little to No Progress


ana-survey-1.png

A survey conducted in late 2011 as part of the Human Terrain Team report found that 45% of the soldiers that responded believed the Afghan National Army has improved little, not much or not at all.

Public Intelligence

A research report compiled earlier this year by a group of social scientists working for the U.S. Army’s Human Terrain System found that members of the Afghan National Army (ANA) are largely seen by U.S. soldiers as unmotivated, highly dependent and making little to no progress. The report, titled “ANA and CF Partnership in Khost and Paktiya”, is based on interviews and observations made during the Human Terrain Team’s time embedded with a U.S. cavalry squadron from November to December 2011. A survey distributed to three other companies also informs much of the report’s findings, which are intended to analyze “the dynamics that influence partnering between the ANA and [coalition forces] and how they contributed to the ANA’s effectiveness in gaining the Afghan population’s support.” The soldiers’ candid responses to the survey provide a great deal of insight into perceptions of the ANA among coalition forces.

Nearly half of soldiers surveyed said the ANA has improved little, not much or not at all during their partnership. A major reason for this lack of progress is reported by U.S. soldiers to be a lack of motivation. The report lists several of the primary reasons why Afghans join the ANA, including earning a salary and consistent employment, as well as the desire to become literate and an opportunity for education. Illiteracy among the ranks of the ANA became such a problem for coalition forces trainers that mandatory literacy programs were instituted in 2009 at the NATO Training Mission – Afghanistan (NTM-A). One trainer told the report’s authors that “I never thought when I entered Afghanistan as a senior trainer I’d be talking more about literacy training than I would about infantry training. But that is truly the case. We recognized very early on in the NTM-A time frame that we had to put a literacy program in place to compensate and mitigate the great illiteracy problem in the ranks as well as in their society.”

ana-survey-2.png

Soldiers responding to the survey are quoted as stating that the “ANA doesn’t care, they are lazy” and the “ANA have no motivation to do anything.” One U.S. Staff Sergeant said that the ANA are not interested in taking on more responsibility, adding that “We do the heavy lifting, they put a face on it.” Nearly half of soldiers surveyed said the ANA has little, not much or no motivation at all to fight. This lack of motivation often causes coalition forces to take the lead even on missions that are supposedly led by the ANA. One soldier told the report’s authors:

“They won’t do a patrol unless U.S. forces are on a patrol. If you ask them ‘hey what did you guys do today,’ you will never hear ‘oh we kicked out a patrol over to Seway, 3 trucks, 15 guys went over there, trying to find out some information about blab blah blah…’ Never gonna happen. They’re just going along with us whenever we need them.”

In fact, 62% of soldiers responding to the survey said that so-called “ANA-led” missions are rarely or never actually planned and executed by Afghan forces. Another soldier reported that a recent “ANA-led” mission that he had been on required him to “spoon-feed” his Afghan counterpart the entire operations order and planning.

A particularly interesting finding in the report is that the views of the Afghan population often differ widely from those of coalition forces on the professionalism and respectability of the ANA. Focusing on data collected during a 2011 survey of residents in Paktiya and Khost provinces, the report finds that the ANA is widely viewed by the Afghan people as more honest, fair and professional than the Afghan National Police. The report recommends that coalition forces do a better job of incorporating the views of the population into their assessments of the ANA, as the perception of stability and legitimacy plays an important role in the overall campaign. If coalition forces cannot do this, then they have only “fought half the battle” and the Afghan National Security Forces “will be able to clear, but not to hold or build.”

Unveiled – Assange Juliets the Romedia Photos


Based on photos of Assange’s appearance at the Ecuadorian Embassy he carefully did not cross the legal boundary of the embassy, that is, the national boundary of Ecuador, by stepping onto the balcony where two videographers were positioned. (A protruding balcony is considered to be outside a building in most laws governing buildings.) This could indicate recognition that if he had crossed the boundary police could have entered the embassy to arrest him on the grounds that he had breached the national boundary and thereby lost asylum protection.

An inadvertent transgression, violating a precise definition of a boundary like a national border, has been used in many other cases to pursue a person across the boundary — borders of the Soviet satellites and US borders, for example.

Assange was awkwardly positioned in the embassy window frame to face the entire widespread crowd as he would have been able to do if he had stood on the balcony.

Toward the end of his speech Assange looked skyward, perhaps toward a helicopter which may have been video-taping his exact position. A toe, a foot, an arm might be forgiven, but a fully body likely not. Evidence will tell if he went too far, or will be accused of doing so.

His own two videographers will have evidence of compliance, although it is not clear if his lower body was taped. Photographs taken by the crowd could show more if they were zoomed to the border of Ecuador at Assange’s lower body.

Not to be overlooked, however, is that his position within the window frame could have been for quick escape against violence or kidnap, official or otherwise.

Julian Assange, founder of WikiLeaks re-enters the embassy after making a statement from a balcony of the Equador Embassy in London, Sunday, Aug. 19, 2012. Assange called on United States President Barack Obama to end a “witch hunt” against the secret-spilling WikiLeaks organization. AP

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WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange looks up as he retreats from the window of Ecuadorian Embassy in central London after making a statement to the media and supporters outside, Sunday, Aug. 19, 2012. Assange called on United States President Barack Obama to end a “witch hunt” against the secret-spilling WikiLeaks organization. AP

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WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange makes a statement to the media and supporters at a window of Ecuadorian Embassy in central London, Sunday, Aug. 19, 2012. Julian Assange entered the embassy in June in an attempt to gain political asylum to prevent him from being extradited to Sweden, where he faces allegations of sex crimes, which he denies. AP

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TOP-SECRET – U.S. Army Advising Foreign Forces Handbook


U.S. Army Advising Foreign Forces Handbook.pdf

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