Etiket arşivi: al qaeda

Al-Qaeda now a U.S. ally in Syria


While we reflect on the 11th anniversary of the al Qaeda attacks on American soil, there is a blinding light that may obscure our view: this sworn enemy now fights hand in hand with the US against the Syrian regime.

The historic State of the Union address by US president George W. Bush on September 20, 2001 is loaded with morals and principles about good and evil.

The president’s ultimatum was clear: either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists.

In Syria, there is mounting evidence that Al Qaeda and its allies are actively deploying terror tactics and suicide bombers to overthrow the Assad regime.

Syrian citizens who prefer the secular and stable state to the prospect of an Iraqi-style sectarian state may well be turning this same question around to the US government: are you with us, or with the terrorists?

This week, head of the Salafi jihad and close ally of al Qaeda, Abu Sayyaf, pledged ”deadly attacks” against Syria as ”our fighters are coming to get you” because ”crimes” by the regime ”prompts us to jihad”.

Bush referred to al Qaeda as the enemies of freedom: ”the terrorists’ directive commands them to kill Christians and Jews”. But Sheikh Muhammad al Zughbey proclaimed that ”your jihad against this infidel criminal and his people is a religious duty … Alawites are more infidel than the Jews and Christians”. Because the new jihad targets Alawites rather than Jews and Christians, does this render them better bed fellows?

By his own admission, Bush stated that al Qaeda was ”linked to many other organisations in different countries … They are recruited from their own nations … where they are trained in the tactics of terror … They are sent back to their homes or sent to hide in countries around the world to plot evil and destruction”.

Yet this is precisely how the foreign jihadists in Syria have been described by reporters. They are funded and armed by Saudi Arabia and Qatar. And they collaborate with the Free Syrian Army which is aided and abetted by the US.

Bush condemned the Taliban regime because they were ”sponsoring and sheltering and supplying terrorists. By aiding and abetting murder, the Taliban regime is committing murder”. Eleven years later, the parallels produce an uncomfortable truth.

If only the Syrian uprising was as simple as the Arab Spring narrative where citizens seek democracy and freedom. But those unarmed protests have long since been hijacked by a cocktail of agendas which have little to do with Syrian democracy, and more to do with a proxy war to create a sectarian Sunni state that weakens Shi’te Iran’s main partner in the region.

Bush was correct in claiming that al Qaeda ”want to overthrow existing governments in many Muslim countries such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan” – who were all US-Israel allies at that time.

But his list stopped short of mentioning Syria or Iraq, the real targets of al Qaeda. Why does overthrowing Syria, using the same terror tactics, fail to attract the same degree of outrage?

Bush continues: ”We will starve terrorists of funding, turn them one against another, drive them from place to place, until there is no refuge or no rest. And we will pursue nations that provide aid or safe haven to terrorism.”

This pledge appears to have fallen on its own sword, given the funding of the jihadists in Syria. The terrorists have bred and spread across borders, which is the opposite of Bush’s prophecy.

The US administration must come clean about its financial aid. It cannot use one hand to sign a blank cheque to the rebels, and the other hand to cover its eyes to their immoral and illegal tactics. It cannot hide behind ”the end justifies the means” as there are too many innocent lives at stake.

Bush rode off on his high horse: ”We are in a fight for our principles, and our first responsibility is to live by them … may God grant us wisdom”.

If the principles and morality are to be taken seriously, then they need to be applied consistently.

The US regime should be actively and publicly distancing itself from the foreign terrorists and Salafist jihadists that are proliferating within sovereign Syria.

It should be condemning al Qaeda for its militant intervention. It should be condemning the Saudi sheikhs who issue fatwas for an Alawite holocaust.

The wisdom that we see is grief over the al Qaeda crime 11 years ago, yet covert collaboration with this sworn enemy today.

Perhaps the US is applying another principle that they may have learned from their pragmatic Arab allies – the enemy of my enemy is my friend.

Joseph Wakim is the founder of Australian Arabic Council.

Al-Qaeda Now a US Ally in Syria


While we reflect on the 11th anniversary of the al Qaeda attacks on American soil, there is a blinding light that may obscure our view: this sworn enemy now fights hand in hand with the US against the Syrian regime.

The historic State of the Union address by US president George W. Bush on September 20, 2001 is loaded with morals and principles about good and evil.

The president’s ultimatum was clear: either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists.

In Syria, there is mounting evidence that Al Qaeda and its allies are actively deploying terror tactics and suicide bombers to overthrow the Assad regime.

Syrian citizens who prefer the secular and stable state to the prospect of an Iraqi-style sectarian state may well be turning this same question around to the US government: are you with us, or with the terrorists?

This week, head of the Salafi jihad and close ally of al Qaeda, Abu Sayyaf, pledged ”deadly attacks” against Syria as ”our fighters are coming to get you” because ”crimes” by the regime ”prompts us to jihad”.

Bush referred to al Qaeda as the enemies of freedom: ”the terrorists’ directive commands them to kill Christians and Jews”. But Sheikh Muhammad al Zughbey proclaimed that ”your jihad against this infidel criminal and his people is a religious duty … Alawites are more infidel than the Jews and Christians”. Because the new jihad targets Alawites rather than Jews and Christians, does this render them better bed fellows?

By his own admission, Bush stated that al Qaeda was ”linked to many other organisations in different countries … They are recruited from their own nations … where they are trained in the tactics of terror … They are sent back to their homes or sent to hide in countries around the world to plot evil and destruction”.

Yet this is precisely how the foreign jihadists in Syria have been described by reporters. They are funded and armed by Saudi Arabia and Qatar. And they collaborate with the Free Syrian Army which is aided and abetted by the US.

Bush condemned the Taliban regime because they were ”sponsoring and sheltering and supplying terrorists. By aiding and abetting murder, the Taliban regime is committing murder”. Eleven years later, the parallels produce an uncomfortable truth.

If only the Syrian uprising was as simple as the Arab Spring narrative where citizens seek democracy and freedom. But those unarmed protests have long since been hijacked by a cocktail of agendas which have little to do with Syrian democracy, and more to do with a proxy war to create a sectarian Sunni state that weakens Shi’te Iran’s main partner in the region.

Bush was correct in claiming that al Qaeda ”want to overthrow existing governments in many Muslim countries such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan” – who were all US-Israel allies at that time.

But his list stopped short of mentioning Syria or Iraq, the real targets of al Qaeda. Why does overthrowing Syria, using the same terror tactics, fail to attract the same degree of outrage?

Bush continues: ”We will starve terrorists of funding, turn them one against another, drive them from place to place, until there is no refuge or no rest. And we will pursue nations that provide aid or safe haven to terrorism.”

This pledge appears to have fallen on its own sword, given the funding of the jihadists in Syria. The terrorists have bred and spread across borders, which is the opposite of Bush’s prophecy.

The US administration must come clean about its financial aid. It cannot use one hand to sign a blank cheque to the rebels, and the other hand to cover its eyes to their immoral and illegal tactics. It cannot hide behind ”the end justifies the means” as there are too many innocent lives at stake.

Bush rode off on his high horse: ”We are in a fight for our principles, and our first responsibility is to live by them … may God grant us wisdom”.

If the principles and morality are to be taken seriously, then they need to be applied consistently.

The US regime should be actively and publicly distancing itself from the foreign terrorists and Salafist jihadists that are proliferating within sovereign Syria.

It should be condemning al Qaeda for its militant intervention. It should be condemning the Saudi sheikhs who issue fatwas for an Alawite holocaust.

The wisdom that we see is grief over the al Qaeda crime 11 years ago, yet covert collaboration with this sworn enemy today.

Perhaps the US is applying another principle that they may have learned from their pragmatic Arab allies – the enemy of my enemy is my friend.

Joseph Wakim is the founder of Australian Arabic Council.

Thanks to http://www.InformationClearHouse.info

Sleeping With the Devil: How U.S. and Saudi Backing of Al Qaeda Led to 9/11


Front row, from left: Major Gen. Hamid Gul, director general of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI), Director of Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Willian Webster; Deputy Director for Operations Clair George; an ISI colonel; and senior CIA official, Milt Bearden at a Mujahideen training camp in North-West Frontier Province of Pakistan in 1987. (source RAWA)

Ronald Reagan meets Afghan Mujahideen Commanders at the White House in 1985 (Reagan Archives)

We Created Al Qaeda to Fight the Soviets in Afghanistan

Jimmy Carter’s National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski admitted on CNN that the U.S. organized and supported Bin Laden and the other originators of “Al Qaeda” in the 1970s to fight the Soviets.

Brzezinski told Al Qaeda’s forefathers – the Mujahadin:

We know of their deep belief in god – that they’re confident that their struggle will succeed. – That land over-there is yours – and you’ll go back to it some day, because your fight will prevail, and you’ll have your homes, your mosques, back again, because your cause is right, and god is on your side.

CIA director and Secretary of Defense Robert Gates confirmed in his memoir that the U.S. backed the Mujahadin in the 1970s.

Secretary of State Hillary Clinton agrees:

MSNBC reported in 1998:

As his unclassified CIA biography states, bin Laden left Saudi Arabia to fight the Soviet army in Afghanistan after Moscow’s invasion in 1979. By 1984, he was running a front organization known as Maktab al-Khidamar – the MAK – which funneled money, arms and fighters from the outside world into the Afghan war.

What the CIA bio conveniently fails to specify (in its unclassified form, at least) is that the MAK was nurtured by Pakistan’s state security services, the Inter-Services Intelligence agency, or ISI, the CIA’s primary conduit for conducting the covert war against Moscow’s occupation.

***

The CIA, concerned about the factionalism of Afghanistan … found that Arab zealots who flocked to aid the Afghans were easier to “read” than the rivalry-ridden natives. While the Arab volunteers might well prove troublesome later, the agency reasoned, they at least were one-dimensionally anti-Soviet for now. So bin Laden, along with a small group of Islamic militants from Egypt, Pakistan, Lebanon, Syria and Palestinian refugee camps all over the Middle East, became the “reliable” partners of the CIA in its war against Moscow.

***

To this day, those involved in the decision to give the Afghan rebels access to a fortune in covert funding and top-level combat weaponry continue to defend that move in the context of the Cold War. Sen. Orrin Hatch, a senior Republican on the Senate Intelligence Committee making those decisions, told my colleague Robert Windrem that he would make the same call again today even knowing what bin Laden would do subsequently. “It was worth it,” he said.

“Those were very important, pivotal matters that played an important role in the downfall of the Soviet Union,” he said.

Indeed, the U.S. started backing Al Qaeda’s forefathers even before the Soviets invaded Afghanistan. As Brzezinski told Le Nouvel Observateur in a 1998 interview:

Question: The former director of the CIA, Robert Gates, stated in his memoirs ["From the Shadows"], that American intelligence services began to aid the Mujahadeen in Afghanistan 6 months before the Soviet intervention. In this period you were the national security adviser to President Carter. You therefore played a role in this affair. Is that correct?Brzezinski: Yes. According to the official version of history, CIA aid to the Mujahadeen began during 1980, that is to say, after the Soviet army invaded Afghanistan, 24 Dec 1979. But the reality, secretly guarded until now, is completely otherwise Indeed, it was July 3, 1979 that President Carter signed the first directive for secret aid to the opponents of the pro-Soviet regime in Kabul. And that very day, I wrote a note to the president in which I explained to him that in my opinion this aid was going to induce a Soviet military intervention.

***
Q: And neither do you regret having supported the Islamic fundamentalism, having given arms and advice to future terrorists?

B: What is most important to the history of the world? The Taliban or the collapse of the Soviet empire? Some stirred-up Moslems or the liberation of Central Europe and the end of the cold war?

The Washington Post reported in 2002:

The United States spent millions of dollars to supply Afghan schoolchildren with textbooks filled with violent images and militant Islamic teachings ….

The primers, which were filled with talk of jihad and featured drawings of guns, bullets, soldiers and mines, have served since then as the Afghan school system’s core curriculum. Even the Taliban used the American-produced books ….

The Council on Foreign Relations notes:

The 9/11 Commission report (PDF) released in 2004 said some of Pakistan’s religious schools or madrassas served as “incubators for violent extremism.” Since then, there has been much debate over madrassas and their connection to militancy.

***

New madrassas sprouted, funded and supported by Saudi Arabia and U.S. Central Intelligence Agency,where students were encouragedto join the Afghan resistance.

And see this.

Veteran journalist Robert Dreyfuss writes:

For half a century the United States and many of its allies saw what I call the “Islamic right” as convenient partners in the Cold War.

***

In the decades before 9/11, hard-core activists and organizations among Muslim fundamentalists on the far right were often viewed as allies for two reasons, because they were seen a fierce anti-communists and because the opposed secular nationalists such as Egypt’s Gamal Abdel Nasser, Iran’s Mohammed Mossadegh.

***

By the end of the 1950s, rather than allying itself with the secular forces of progress in the Middle East and the Arab world, the United States found itself in league with Saudi Arabia’s Islamist legions. Choosing Saudi Arabia over Nasser’s Egypt was probably the single biggest mistake the United States has ever made in the Middle East.

A second big mistake … occurred in the 1970s, when, at the height of the Cold War and the struggle for control of the Middle East, the United States either supported or acquiesced in the rapid growth of Islamic right in countries from Egypt to Afghanistan. In Egypt, Anwar Sadat brought the Muslim Brotherhood back to Egypt. In Syria, the United States, Israel, and Jordan supported the Muslim Brotherhood in a civil war against Syria. And … Israel quietly backed Ahmed Yassin and the Muslim Brotherhood in the West Bank and Gaza, leading to the establishment of Hamas.

Still another major mistake was the fantasy that Islam would penetrate the USSR and unravel the Soviet Union in Asia. It led to America’s support for the jihadists in Afghanistan. But … America’s alliance with the Afghan Islamists long predated the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and had its roots in CIA activity in Afghanistan in the 1960s and in the early and mid-1970s. The Afghan jihad spawned civil war in Afghanistan in the late 1980s, gave rise to the Taliban, and got Osama bin Laden started on building Al Qaeda.

Would the Islamic right have existed without U.S. support? Of course. This is not a book for the conspiracy-minded. But there is no question that the virulence of the movement that we now confront—and which confronts many of the countries in the region, too, from Algeria to India and beyond—would have been significantly less had the United States made other choices during the Cold War.

In other words, if the U.S. and our allies hadn’t backed the radical violent Muslims instead of more stable, peaceful groups in the Middle East, radical Islam wouldn’t have grown so large.

Pakistani nuclear scientist and peace activist Perez Hoodbhoy writes:

Every religion, including Islam, has its crazed fanatics. Few in numbers and small in strength, they can properly be assigned to the “loony” section. This was true for Islam as well until 1979, the year of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Indeed, there may well have been no 911 but for this game-changer.

***

Officials like Richard Perle, Assistant Secretary of Defense, immediately saw Afghanistan not as the locale of a harsh and dangerous conflict to be ended but as a place to teach the Russians a lesson. Such “bleeders” became the most influential people in Washington .

***

The task of creating such solidarity fell upon Saudi Arabia, together with other conservative Arab monarchies. This duty was accepted readily and they quickly made the Afghan Jihad their central cause…. But still more importantly, to go heart and soul for jihad was crucial at a time when Saudi legitimacy as the guardians of Islam was under strong challenge by Iran, which pointed to the continued occupation of Palestine by America’s partner, Israel. An increasing number of Saudis were becoming disaffected by the House of Saud – its corruption, self-indulgence, repression, and closeness to the US. Therefore, the Jihad in Afghanistan provided an excellent outlet for the growing number of militant Sunni activists in Saudi Arabia, and a way to deal with the daily taunts of the Iranian clergy.

***

The bleeders soon organized and armed the Great Global Jihad, funded by Saudi Arabia, and executed by Pakistan. A powerful magnet for militant Sunni activists was created by the US. The most hardened and ideologically dedicated men were sought on the logic that they would be the best fighters. Advertisements, paid for from CIA funds, were placed in newspapers and newsletters around the world offering inducements and motivations to join the Jihad.

American universities produced books for Afghan children that extolled the virtues of jihad and of killing communists. Readers browsing through book bazaars in Rawalpindi and Peshawar can, even today, sometimes find textbooks produced as part of the series underwritten by a USAID $50 million grant to the University of Nebraska in the 1980′s . These textbooks sought to counterbalance Marxism through creating enthusiasm in Islamic militancy. They exhorted Afghan children to “pluck out the eyes of the Soviet enemy and cut off his legs”. Years after the books were first printed they were approved by the Taliban for use in madrassas – a stamp of their ideological correctness and they are still widely available in both Afghanistan and Pakistan.

At the international level, Radical Islam went into overdrive as its superpower ally, the United States, funneled support to the mujahideen. Ronald Reagan feted jihadist leaders on the White House lawn, and the U.S. press lionized them.

And the chief of the visa section at the U.S. consulate in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia (J. Michael Springmann, who is now an attorney in private practice) that the CIA insisted that visas be issued to Afghanis so they could travel to the U.S. to be trained in terrorism in the United States, and then sent back to Afghanistan to fight the Soviets.

1993 World Trade Center Bombing

New York District Attorney Robert M. Morgenthau believed that the intelligence services could and should have stopped the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center, but they were preoccupied with other issues cover. As well-known investigative journalist Robert I. Friedman wrote in New York Magazine in 1995:

Shiekh Omar Abdel Rahman commands an almost deified adoration and respect in certain Islamic circles. It was his 1980 fatwa – religious decree – condemning Anwar Sadat for making peace with Israel that is widely believed to be responsible for Sadat’s assassination a year later. (Rahman was subsequently tried but acquitted.)

***

The CIA paid to send Abdel Rahman to Peshawar ‘to preach to the Afghans about the necessity of unity to overthrow the Kabul regime,’ according to Professor Rubin. By all accounts, Rahman was brilliant at inspiring the faithful.

As a reward for his services, the CIA gave the sheikh a one-year visa to the United States in May, 1990 – even though he was on a State Department terrorism watch list that should have barred him from the country.

After a public outcry in the wake of the World Trade Centre bombing, a State Department representative discovered that Rahman had, in fact, received four United States visas dating back to December 15, 1986. All were given to him by CIA agents acting as consular officers at American embassies in Khartoum and Cairo. The CIA officers claimed they didn’t know the sheikh was one of the most notorious political figures in the Middle East and a militant on the State Department’s list of undesirables. The agent in Khartoum said that when the sheikh walked in the computers were down and the Sudanese clerk didn’t bother to check the microfiche file.

Says one top New York investigator: ‘Left with the choice between pleading stupidity or else admitting deceit, the CIA went with stupidity.’

***

The sheikh arrived in Brooklyn at a fortuitous time for the CIA. In the wake of the Soviet Union’s retreat from Afghanistan, Congress had slashed the amount of covert aid going to the mujaheddin. The international network of Arab-financed support groups became even more vital to the CIA, including the string of jihad offices that had been set up across America with the help of Saudi and American intelligence. To drum up support, the agency paved the way for veterans of the Afghan conflict to visit the centres and tell their inspirational war stories; in return, the centres collected millions of dollars for the rebels at a time when they needed it most.

There were jihad offices in Jersey City, Atlanta and Dallas, but the most important was the one in Brooklyn, called Alkifah – Arabic for ‘the struggle.’ That storefront became the de facto headquarters of the sheikh.

***

On November 5, 1990, Rabbi Meir Kahane, an ultra-right-wing Zionist militant, was shot in the throat with a .357 magnum in a Manhattan hotel; El-Sayyid Nosair was gunned down by an off-duty postal inspector outside the hotel, and the murder weapon was found a few feet from his hand.

A subsequent search of Nosair’s Cliffside Park, New Jersey home turned up forty boxes of evidence – evidence that, had the D.A.’s office and the FBI looked at it more carefully, would have revealed an active terrorist conspiracy about to boil over in New York.

***

In addition to discovering thousands of rounds of ammunition and hit lists with the names of New York judges and prosecutors, investigators found amongst the Nosair evidence classified U.S. military-training manuals.

***

Also found amongst Nosair’s effects were several documents, letters and notebooks in Arabic, which when eventually translated would point to e terror conspiracy against the United States. The D.A.’s office shipped these, along with the other evidence, to the FBI’s office at 26 Federal Plaza. ‘We gave all this stuff to the bureau, thinking that they were well equipped,’ says one source close to the D.A.’s office. ‘After the World Trade Centre, we discovered they never translated the material.’

According to other sources familiar with the case, the FBI told District Attorney Robert M. Morgenthau that Nosair was a lone gunman, not part of a broader conspiracy; the prosecution took this position at trial and lost, only convicting Nosair of gun charges. Morgenthau speculated the CIA may have encouraged the FBI not to pursue any other leads, these sources say. ‘The FBI lied to me,’ Morgenthau has told colleagues. ‘They’re supposed to untangle terrorist connections, but they can’t be trusted to do the job.’

Three years later, on the day the FBI arrested four Arabs for the World Trade Centre bombing, saying it had all of the suspects, Morgenthau’s ears pricked up. He didn’t believe the four were ‘self-starters,’ and speculated that there was probably a larger network as well as a foreign sponsor. He also had a hunch that the suspects would lead back to Sheikh Abdel Rahman. But he worried that the dots might not be connected because the U.S. government was protecting the sheikh for his help in Afghanistan.

***

Nevertheless, some in the D.A.’s office believe that until the Ryder van exploded underneath New York’s tallest building, the sheikh and his men were being protected by the CIA. Morgenthau reportedly believes the CIA brought the sheikh to Brooklyn in the first place….

As far as can be determined, no American agency is investigating leads suggesting foreign-government involvement in the New York terror conspiracy. For example,Saudi intelligence has contributed to Sheikh Rahman’s legal-defence fund, according to Mohammed al-Khilewi, the former first secretary to the Saudi mission at the U.N.

Friedman notes that intelligence agents had possession of notes which should have linked all of these terrorists, but failed to connect the dots prior to 1993.

CNN ran a special report in 1994 called “Terror Nation? U.S. Creation?“, which noted – as summarized by Congressman Peter Deutsch:

Some Afghan groups that have had close affiliation with Pakistani Intelligence are believed to have been involved in the [1993] New York World Trade Center bombings.

***

Pro-Western afghan officials … officially warned the U.S. government about Hekmatyar no fewer than four times. The last warning delivered just days before the [1993] Trade Center attack.” Speaking to former CIA Director Robert Gates, about Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, Peter Arnett reports, “The Pakistanis showered Gulbuddin Hekmatyar with U.S. provided weapons and sang his praises to the CIA. They had close ties with Hakmatyar going back to the mid-1970′s.”

This is interesting because it is widely-acknowledged that Gulbuddin Hekmatyar was enthusiastically backed by the U.S. For example, U.S. News and World Report says:

[He was] once among America’s most valued allies. In the 1980s, the CIA funneled hundreds of millions of dollars in weapons and ammunition to help them battle the Soviet Army during its occupation of Afghanistan. Hekmatyar, then widely considered by Washington to be a reliable anti-Soviet rebel, was even flown to the United States by the CIA in 1985.

As and others reported, an FBI informant involved in the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center begged the FBI to substitute fake bomb power for real explosives, but his FBI handler somehow let real explosives be used.

Bosnia

As professor of strategy at the Naval War College and former National Security Agency intelligence analyst and counterintelligence officer John R. Schindler documents, the U.S. supported Bin Laden and other Al Qaeda terrorists in Bosnia.

2001

As reported by Newsweek, the New York Times and others, an FBI informant hosted and rented a room to 2 of the 9/11 hijackers in 2000 while they were in the U.S., but then failed to stop them.

Indeed, former counter-terrorism boss Richard Clarke theorizes that top CIA brass tried to recruit the hijackers and turn them to our side, but were unsuccessful. And – when they realized had failed – they covered up their tracks so that the FBI would not investigate their illegal CIA activities , “malfeasance and misfeasance”, on U.S. soil.

(The Congressional Joint Inquiry into 9/11 sought to interview the informant, the FBI refused outright, and then hid him in an unknown location, and that a high-level FBI official stated these blocking maneuvers were undertaken under orders from the White House.)

One of the main trainers of Bin Laden and Al Qaeda worked at various times for the Green Berets, the CIA and the FBI. As former ABC News investigative reporter Peter Lance says (as summarized by Raw Story):

Ali Mohamed … was something of an al Qaeda super-spy who managed to work with terrorists, the Green Berets, the CIA and become an FBI informant, even while ensuring Osama bin Laden’s safe passage around the middle east.

***

Mohamed … was actually responsible for writing portions of the terror network’s training manual and played a key role in the bombings of U.S. embassies in Africa which left over 200 dead…

“He believes that chagrin over the fact that bin Laden’s spy stole top-secret intelligence (including, for example, the positions of all Green Beret and SEAL units worldwide) led to a decision on high to bury the entire Able Danger intelligence program, which identified the Al Qaeda cell active in Brooklyn months before the 9/11 attacks, and also identified Ali Mohamed as a member of bin Laden’s inner circle as early as March 2000.”

Bloomberg reported in 2006:

Mohamed trained terrorists how to hijack airliners, bomb buildings and assassinate rivals. He created al-Qaeda cells in the U.S., even helping with fund raising. He also arranged meetings between bin Laden and Hezbollah leaders and scouted bombing targets, including U.S. embassies in East Africa.

What makes it all especially disturbing is that during much of this time Mohamed was a U.S. citizen, an operative for the CIA and FBI, and a member of the U.S. Army.

***

Mohamed’s initial infiltration of the U.S. military came in 1981 when, at the age of 29, he participated in an exchange program at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, home of the Green Berets and Delta Force.

After returning to Egypt he was drummed out of that country’s military because of his radical Islamic views. No matter. The CIA took him on in 1984, sending him to infiltrate a Hamburg mosque. There, Mohamed quickly blew his cover, resulting in his name being added to a watch list of suspected terrorists.

That still didn’t stop Mohamed, who was allowed to re-enter the U.S. in 1985.

***

He joined the U.S. Army a year later, which took him back to Fort Bragg, where his superiors were alarmed by his praise of the assassination of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat. His radicalism did not lead to his dismissal, though. Instead, Mohamed was asked to share his views with officers so that they might better understand the Islamic way.

***

He stole documents at Fort Bragg and fashioned them into a terrorism training manual, which he used to help bin Laden’s personal security forces and countless terrorists. He also used his military credentials to take an unauthorized trip to Afghanistan, where he fought Soviet forces, a violation for which he was not disciplined.

After his military service ended, Mohamed did bin Laden’s bidding on many other fronts, including scouting bombing targets such as U.S. embassies in East Africa. He was arrested in 1998 after his part in the plots was revealed, and pleaded guilty in 2000 to five counts of conspiracy.

***

Mohamed is thought to be supplying information helpful to the U.S. government from an undisclosed prison cell, and at least one person thinks his final chapter has yet to be written.

David Runke, a defense attorney in the African embassies bombing case, says, “I think the most likely thing that will happen is he’ll be released, he’ll be given a new name and a new identity, and he will pick up a life someplace.”

Rocky Mountain News noted in 2006:

Currently in U.S. custody, his whereabouts and legal status are closely guarded secrets, according to National Geographic Channel officials.

UC Berkeley Professor emeritus Peter Dale Scott is even less generous in regards to our government’s failure to stop Mohamed:

It is now generally admitted that Ali Mohamed (known in the al Qaeda camps as Abu Mohamed al Amriki — “Father Mohamed the American”) worked for the FBI, the CIA, and U.S. Special Forces. As he later confessed in court, he also aided the terrorist Ayman al-Zawahiri, a co-founder of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, and by then an aide to bin Laden, when he visited America to raise money.

The 9/11 Report mentioned him, and said that the plotters against the U.S. Embassy in Kenya were “led” (their word) by Ali Mohamed.

***

Patrick Fitzgerald, U.S. Attorney who negotiated a plea bargain and confession from Ali Mohamed, said this in testimony to the Commission

Ali Mohamed. …. trained most of al Qaeda’s top leadership – including Bin Laden and Zawahiri – and most of al Qaeda’s top trainers. He gave some training to persons who would later carry out the 1993 World Trade Center bombing…. From 1994 until his arrest in 1998, he lived as an American citizen in California, applying for jobs as an FBI translator.

Patrick Fitzgerald knew Ali Mohamed well. In 1994 he had named him as an unindicted co-conspirator in the New York landmarks case, yet allowed him to remain free. This was because, as Fitzgerald knew, Ali Mohamed was an FBI informant, from at least 1993 and maybe 1989. Thus, from 1994 “until his arrest in 1998 [by which time the 9/11 plot was well under way], Mohamed shuttled between California, Afghanistan, Kenya, Somalia and at least a dozen other countries.” Shortly after 9/11, Larry C. Johnson, a former State Department and CIA official, faulted the FBI publicly for using Mohamed as an informant, when it should have recognized that the man was a high-ranking terrorist plotting against the United States.

[I]n 1993 Ali Mohamed had been detained by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police in Canada, when he inquired at an airport after an incoming al Qaeda terrorist who turned out to be carrying two forged Saudi passports. Mohamed immediately told the RCMP to make a phone call to the United States, and the call secured his release. We’ve since been told that it was Mohamed’s West coast FBI handler, John Zent, “who vouched for Ali and got him released.”

This release enabled Ali to go on to Kenya, take pictures of the U.S. Embassy, and deliver them to bin Laden for the Embassy bombing plot.

In August 2006 there was a National Geographic Special on Ali Mohamed. We can take this as the new official fallback position on Ali Mohamed, because John Cloonan, the FBI agent who worked with Fitzgerald on Mohamed, helped narrate it. I didn’t see the show, but here’s what TV critics said about its contents:

Ali Mohamed manipulated the FBI, CIA and U.S. Army on behalf of Osama bin Laden. Mohamed trained terrorists how to hijack airliners, bomb buildings and assassinate rivals. [D]uring much of this time Mohamed was …, an operative for the CIA and FBI, and a member of the U.S. Army. …Mohamed turned up in FBI surveillance photos as early as 1989, training radical Muslims who would go on to assassinate Jewish militant Meir Kahane and detonate a truck bomb at the World Trade Center. He not only avoided arrest, but managed to become an FBI informant while writing most of the al Qaeda terrorist manual and helping plan attacks on American troops in Somalia and U.S. embassies in Africa.

That Mohamed trained al Qaeda in hijacking planes and wrote most of the al Qaeda terrorist manual is confirmed in a new book by Lawrence Wright, who has seen US Government records. Let me say this again: one of al-Qaeda’s top trainers in terrorism and how to hijack airplanes was an operative for FBI, CIA, and the Army…

Within days of 9/11 Cloonan rushed backed from Yemen and interviewed Ali, whom the Feds had allowed to slip into witness protection, and demanded to know the details of the plot. At that point Ali wrote it all out – including details of how he’d counseled would-be hijackers on how to smuggle box cutters on board aircraft and where to sit, to effect the airline seizures.

If all these latest revelations about Ali Mohamed are true, then:

1) a key planner of the 9/11 plot, and trainer in hijacking, was simultaneously an informant for the FBI.

2) This operative trained the members for all of the chief Islamist attacks inside the United States – the first WTC bombing, the New York landmarks plot, and finally 9/11, as well as the attacks against Americans in Somalia and Kenya.

3) And yet for four years Mohamed was allowed to move in and out of the country as an unindicted conspirator. Then, unlike his trainees, he was allowed to plea-bargain. To this day he may still not have been sentenced for any crime.…

All three had been trained by Ali Mohamed back in the late 1980s at a rifle range, where the FBI had photographed them, before terminating this surveillance in the fall of 1989.

The U.S. Government was thus in an excellent position to arrest, indict, and convict all of the terrorists involved, including Mohamed…

While this post does not address any “inside job” theories, there is evidence that intelligence services made other priorities – perhaps 1) covering up their previous backing of Al Qaeda, 2) trying to turn Al Qaeda operatives to our side, or 3) reserving the possibility of using them in future missions in other parts of the world – more important than capturing and disrupting Al Qaeda leadership:

  • A high-level military intelligence officer says that his unit – tasked with tracking Bin Laden prior to 9/11 – was pulled off the task, and their warnings that the World Trade Center and Pentagon were being targeted were ignored
  • The CIA may have helped many of the 9/11 hijackers get their visas to the U.S.

Nothing Has Changed … We’re STILL Backing Terrorists to Carry Out Geopolitical Goals

If you assume that this is ancient history, remember that:

  • The U.S. and Saudi Arabia are currently supporting Al Qaeda terrorists in Syria (see this, this andthis)

Al Qaeda and NATO’s Pan-Arab Terrorist Blitzkrieg


Terrorists Supported by NATO Target Syria and Algeria

by Tony Cartalucci

Western policy makers admit that NATO’s operations in Libya have played the primary role in emboldening Al Qaeda’s AQIM faction (Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb). The Fortune 500-funded Brookings Institution’s Bruce Riedel in his article, "The New Al Qaeda Menace," admits that AQIM is now heavily armed thanks to NATO’s intervention in Libya, and that AQIM’s base in Mali, North Africa, serves as a staging ground for terrorist activities across the region.

Image: NATO’s intervention in Libya has resurrected listed-terrorist organization and Al Qaeda affiliate, LIFG. It had previously fought in Iraq and Afghanistan, and now has fighters, cash and weapons, all courtesy of NATO, spreading as far west as Mali, and as far east as Syria. The feared "global Caliphate" Neo-Cons have been scaring Western children with for a decade is now taking shape via US-Saudi, Israeli, and Qatari machinations, not "Islam." In fact, real Muslims have paid the highest price in fighting this real "war against Western-funded terrorism."

….

AQIM, like their Libyan counterparts, the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) are both listed by the US State Department as "Foreign Terrorist Organizations." Likewise, both the UK Home Office (.pdf, listed as GSPC) and the UN recognize both organizations as terrorists.

Despite this, military intervention in Libya was pursued by the West and condoned by the UN with full knowledge that the militants leading so-called "pro-democracy uprisings" were in fact merely the continuation of decades of violent terrorism carried out by Al Qaeda affiliates. The West had full knowledge of this, primarily because it was Western intelligence agencies arming and supporting these militants for the last 30 years, in Libya’s case, while coddling their leaders in Washington and London.

Additionally, the US Army itself meticulously documented foreign terrorists fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan, noting that the highest percentage per capita emanated from Libya’s cities of Benghazi and Darnah, the so-called "cradle" of 2011’s "pro-democracy uprisings" in Libya.

CTC at West Point’s "Al-Qa’ida’s Foreign Fighters in Iraq." (.pdf)

….

What unfolded was a premeditated lie – where placard waving "activists" overnight turned into battle-hardened heavily armed, tank driving, jet flying militants waging a nationwide battle against Libyan leader, Muammar Qaddafi. In reality, it was the fruition of 30 years of covert support the West has poured into militant groups across the region – support that would not end with the fall of Qaddafi.

Image: Libyan terrorist manning a tank during NATO’s 2011 overthrow of the Libyan government. The media expects the public to believe placard waving peaceful demonstrators had somehow, in just days, transitioned into tank driving, jet flying rebel forces – just like in Hollywood.

LIFG terrorists promptly turned both east to Syria and west to Mali beyond their borders – a logistical matter they had perfected during their operations in Iraq and Afghanistan over the past decade. LIFG commander Abdul Hakim Belhaj, as early as November 2011, arrived on the Turkish-Syrian border to provide cash, weapons, and LIFG terrorist fighters, overseen by Western intelligence along with US funding and arms laundered through Gulf Cooperative Council (GCC) members such as Qatar and Saudi Arabia. Since then Libyan militants have been confirmed to be leading entire brigades of foreign fighters inside Syria.

And as Bruce Riedel of Brookings concedes, these weapons went west to Mali as well. Algeria had feared just such a scenario unfolding with NATO’s intervention in Libya – a fear now fully realized. Ironically, Riedel, in August 2011, had tried to make a case for Algeria being "next to fall" in an article titled literally, "Algeria Will Be Next to Fall."

A year ago, Riedel attempted to argue that it would be the so-called "Arab Spring" that would spread into Algeria after having taken root in neighboring Libya. He had eluded to, and it has now become abundantly clear, that by "Arab Spring," Riedel meant, US-backed subversion, and more specifically NATO-armed Al Qaeda-brand militancy and terrorism.

With the US now openly arming, supporting, and literally "cheering" Al Qaeda in Syria, it is clear that the "War on Terror" is an unprecedented geopolitical fraud perpetuated at the cost of millions of lives destroyed and an incalculable social and economic toll. NATO, with full knowledge of the consequences is literally carving out of North Africa and the Middle East, the so-called "Caliphate" Western leaders had held over their impressionable people’s heads as the impetus to perpetually wage global war. Torn from the pages of Orwell’s 1984, an artificial war has been created to carry forward corporate-financier machinations both abroad and domestically. The so-called threat to Western civilization is in fact a foreign legion of Western corporate-financier interests, executing Wall Street and London’s foreign policy on a global scale where and in a manner traditional Western forces cannot.

NATO’s terrorist blitzkrieg across the Arab World will not end in Syria. It will continue, if allowed, into Iran, through the Caucasus Mountains and into Russia, across China’s western borders, and even across Southeast Asia. The price for ignorance, apathy, and complicity in supporting the West’s so-called "War on Terror" will ironically reap all the horrors and then some in reality, that were promised to us if we didn’t fight this "Long War."

Our support of both the political gambits of our politicians, as well as our daily patronage of the corporate-financier interests driving this agenda have already reaped an unprecedented and still growing regional safe haven for terrorists – and as moderate secular governments continue to be undermined and toppled, we can only imagine the blowback, retaliation, and other consequences as this destructive foreign policy unfolds. To imagine that such meddling will not end up being visited back upon us, even if in the form of a false flag attack dwarfing 9/11, would be folly.

Already, we are suffering economic devastation and an increasingly stifling security apparatus at home, and as long as we capitulate to this current agenda instead of asserting a more rational one of our own, it will only get worse.

“Two Cheers” for Terrorism: US Mainstream Media Applauds Syria’s Al Qaeda Rebels


by Tony Cartalucci

Foreign Policy published a recent article literally titled, "Two Cheers for Syrian Islamists." In it, general editor of the Neo-Con Middle East Forum Gary Gambill concedes that the Syrian government "would not be in the trouble it’s in today were it not for the Islamists," revealing what the West and its media houses have attempted but failed at obfuscating – that the violence in Syria is the work of sectarian extremists, not "pro-democracy activists." The latter’s existence was amplified by the Western media specifically to provide cover and legitimacy for the violence and subversion of the former.

Image: Must be seen to believe – screenshot of FP’s article literally titled, "Two Cheers for Syrian Islamists." The writer, Gary Gambill, comes from the Middle East Forum which regular features the warmongering rants of Neo-Cons like Daniel Pipes and Islamophobia-propagandist Robert Spencer.

….

Gambill continues his "two cheers" for terrorism in perhaps the most perverse statement found to-date in the Western press on the subject:

"Islamists — many of them hardened by years of fighting U.S. forces in Iraq — are simply more effective fighters than their secular counterparts. Assad has had extraordinary difficulty countering tactics perfected by his former jihadist allies, particularly suicide bombings and roadside bombs."

Gambill is gushingly praising men who have killed Western troops, admiring their prowess on the battlefield through their use of indiscriminate terrorist tactics which have killed and maimed tens of thousands of civilians across the Arab World.

The Big Lie

Gambill continues by stating, "The Sunni Islamist surge may also be essential to inflicting a full-blown strategic defeat on Iran," before concluding at length as to why the US should support terrorism in Syria:

"For the foreseeable future, however, Iran constitutes a far greater and more immediate threat to U.S. national interests. Whatever misfortunes Sunni Islamists may visit upon the Syrian people, any government they form will be strategically preferable to the Assad regime, for three reasons: A new government in Damascus will find continuing the alliance with Tehran unthinkable, it won’t have to distract Syrians from its minority status with foreign policy adventurism like the ancien régime, and it will be flush with petrodollars from Arab Gulf states (relatively) friendly to Washington.

So long as Syrian jihadis are committed to fighting Iran and its Arab proxies, we should quietly root for them — while keeping our distance from a conflict that is going to get very ugly before the smoke clears. There will be plenty of time to tame the beast after Iran’s regional hegemonic ambitions have gone down in flames. " –Gary Gambill, "Two Cheers for Syrian Islamists," (2012)

In this, Gambill divulges the true agenda behind destabilizing Syria – the isolation and undermining of Iran to the east, and Hezbollah in Lebanon to the West. Gambill also mentions the destruction of Syria as a means of realigning Iraq to US interests.

Gambill disingenuously claims that the US can do "little about" what he calls the "political ascendancy" of these sectarian extremists, portraying the rise of violence across the Levant and the miraculous resurrection of the Muslim Brotherhood across the Arab World as coincidentally aligned to American interests, and something that should be allowed, even encouraged, to run its course.

Gambill fails to mention, however, that this "political ascendancy" was planned, funded, armed, and organized by the US, Israel, and Saudi Arabia as far back as 2007, according to a detailed, 9-page report published by Seymour Hersh in the New Yorker titled "The Redirection."

In the report, it explicitly states:

"To undermine Iran, which is predominantly Shiite, the Bush Administration has decided, in effect, to reconfigure its priorities in the Middle East. In Lebanon, the Administration has coöperated with Saudi Arabia’s government, which is Sunni, in clandestine operations that are intended to weaken Hezbollah, the Shiite organization that is backed by Iran. The U.S. has also taken part in clandestine operations aimed at Iran and its ally Syria. A by-product of these activities has been the bolstering of Sunni extremist groups that espouse a militant vision of Islam and are hostile to America and sympathetic to Al Qaeda." –Seymour Hersh, The Redirection (2007)

Hersh’s report would also include:

"the Saudi government, with Washington’s approval, would provide funds and logistical aid to weaken the government of President Bashir Assad, of Syria. The Israelis believe that putting such pressure on the Assad government will make it more conciliatory and open to negotiations." –Seymour Hersh, The Redirection (2007)

In essence, Gambill’s gushing support for terrorism – and in particular, terrorists who have fought and killed Americans – is but the latest in an attempt to spin and repackage Al Qaeda and the fraudulent "War on Terror" as public awareness outgrows the fallacious "humanitarian pretenses" the operation has been couched within hitherto.

Gambill’s material support for terrorism echos a recent article titled, "Al-Qaeda’s Specter in Syria," published by the Council on Foreign Relations, a premier Fortune 500-funded US think-tank, which stated:

"The Syrian rebels would be immeasurably weaker today without al-Qaeda in their ranks. By and large, Free Syrian Army (FSA) battalions are tired, divided, chaotic, and ineffective. Feeling abandoned by the West, rebel forces are increasingly demoralized as they square off with the Assad regime’s superior weaponry and professional army. Al-Qaeda fighters, however, may help improve morale. The influx of jihadis brings discipline, religious fervor, battle experience from Iraq, funding from Sunni sympathizers in the Gulf, and most importantly, deadly results. In short, the FSA needs al-Qaeda now."

Why is Gambill Writing This?

Consider the audience of Foreign Policy. It is not propaganda fit for the masses. Rather it is for aspiring, as well as low to mid-level members of the global corporate-financier establishment. Western involvement in both Libya and Syria have undermined the governments, institutions, and organizations many of these people work for, and as public awareness (and anger) grows, it will be these low to mid-level members who bear the brunt of the system’s collapsing legitimacy. Many are already expressing doubts over the viability and nature of the West’s global agenda as it unfolds.

It must be remembered that the terrorists Gambill is "cheering" for had ensnared millions of Western troops for over a decade in the so-called "War on Terror." It has killed thousands of troops, tens of thousands were maimed both physically and psychologically, and hundreds of thousands have forever lost time they could have spent at home with their loved ones. As public awareness grows of Western support for these very terrorists, it would be almost inconceivable that there would not be a profound, perhaps even violent backlash against people like Gambill and the establishment he represents.

Gambill’s cheerleading is designed to rally the lower ranks of the establishment around this new narrative as he and fellow warmongers attempt to flee forward through Syria and then into Iran. Eventually, the reckless promotion of terrorism Gambill and others are committed to will once again call US soldiers, sailors, Marines, and airmen into harms way – either to fight nations defending themselves against US-sponsored terrorism, or to liquidate US-supported terrorists when their services are longer needed.

Gambill by causally saying, "there will be plenty of time to tame the beast after Iran’s regional hegemonic ambitions have gone down in flames," means specifically more US troops will be deployed, and will most certainly die, all in the pursuit of corporate-financier interests in the Middle East. Gambill specifically refers to "hegemonic ambitions," not any conceivable threat to US defense, as the impetus for cheering on terrorism, a theme that is omnipresent throughout US policy papers on Iran.

Legendary US Marine Corps General Smedley Butler once said "war is a racket." For an increasing number of people worldwide, they are beginning to understand why.

The NSA & The FBI – New Detail on Confronting the Terrorist Threat – from al-Qaeda to Skinheads


FBI headquarters in Washington, D.C. (Credit: www.fbi.gov)

Washington, D.C., August 18, 2012 – A new Web resource posted today by the National Security Archive offers a wide-ranging compilation of declassified records detailing the operations of a key component of U.S. national security. Among the new documents are internal reports on domestic terrorism that expand on what previously public intelligence assessments have revealed.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has been one of the best known and most scrutinized components of the U.S. government for well over seventy years. As a result it has been the subject of non-fiction books, novels, a multitude of articles, films and television shows, and congressional hearings. In addition to its criminal investigative effort and pursuit of bank-robbers that propelled it into the news, the Bureau has also been heavily involved in counterintelligence, counterterrorism, foreign intelligence, and counter-subversion work. FBI successes, failures, and abuses have helped produce attention and controversy for the Bureau.

Today’s National Security Archive posting of 38 documents – drawn from a variety of sources – provides a window into the Bureau’s activities in those areas since, with one exception, 1970. The collection’s aim is to present a foundation for understanding the scope and history of the organization, and in some instances to offer correctives to popular accounts. Freedom of Information Act requests yielded a number of the documents included in the briefing book, which are being posted here for the first time. Included are two intelligence assessments of the domestic terrorist threat – The Terrorist Threat to the U.S. Homeland: An FBI Assessment (2004) and A Threat Assessment for Domestic Terrorism, 2005-2006 (2007) – which examine the threat from al-Qaeda and its supporters as well as from assorted home-grown terrorist groups.

The latter assessments offer a broader and more detailed view of the terrorist issue, including on al-Qaeda, than the key judgments of the 2007 National Intelligence Estimate released by the Director of National Intelligence. The 2004 assessment stated that FBI investigations revealed “extensive support for terrorist causes in the US,” although they also found little evidence of sympathizers being actively engaged in planning or carrying out terrorist attacks.

Additional details on some of the domestic threats mentioned in the 2004 and 2007 estimates can be found in other newly released assessments – such as those on white supremacist groups. Those assessments discuss the threats from ‘stealth’ fascists, white supremacist infiltration of law enforcement, and the possibility of white supremacists employing suicide terrorism to further their cause.

Also, included are detailed inspector general reports concerning the FBI’s performance in the case of Robert Hanssen, the FBI official who spied for the Soviet Union and Russia, its handling of information related to the September 11 terrorist attacks, and its employment of national security letters. Finally, included are a number of Congressional Research Service studies on the Bureau’s history and current activities, including its terrorism investigations.

* * *

Documenting the FBI

By Jeffrey T. Richelson

Federal Bureau of Investigation, The Terrorist Threat to the U.S. Homeland: An FBI Assessment, April 15, 2004. Secret/NOFORN. Source: FBI Freedom of Information Act Release.

For almost eight decades the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has been one the best known components of the federal government. The organization, or its long-time director, J. Edgar Hoover, have been the subject of a number of non-fiction books – ranging from the adulatory to the intensely critical. 1 There have also been assorted novels, films, and television shows in which the Bureau or Hoover were central elements. 2

Created in 1908, as an untitled Justice Department bureau, it became the Bureau of Investigation in 1909, the Division of Investigation in 1933, and the FBI in 1935. Today, the FBI consists of its headquarters in Washington, D.C., its training academy in Quantico, Virginia, other elements in Virginia, 56 domestic field offices, 380 resident agencies, and more than 60 legal attaché offices outside the United States. As of April 30, 2012, it had 35,850 employees (13, 851 special agents, and 21, 989 support personnel) and a budget of $8.1 billion. 3

It became best known, at least initially, for its operations directed against high-profile gangsters, such as the fatal shooting of John Dillinger on July 22, 1934, in front of Chicago’s Biograph Theater by two of the Bureau’s special agents. 4 Subsequently, the Bureau’s prominence grew as a result of its national security activities. Over the years, those operations have included the gathering of foreign intelligence, counterintelligence, counter-terrorism, and combating, what were in the view of the Bureau (and others), subversive elements. 5

The documents posted today by the National Security Archive range from unclassified records to redacted versions of Secret or “Law Enforcement Sensitive” documents that were obtained under the Freedom of Information Act as well as from a variety of government web pages (including the Department of Justice and General Accountability Office) and private organization sites (including the Federation of American Scientists and Government Attic). The records focus on the Bureau’s foreign intelligence, counterintelligence, and counterterrorism activities since (with one exception) 1970.

Thus, several documents focus on the FBI’s foreign intelligence activities. One examines its operation of the Special Intelligence Service, which was active in Latin America during World War II (Document 9). Another discusses how the Joint Chiefs of Staff requested the FBI employ its “internal information program” to gather intelligence that would be useful in planning and executing a second attempt to rescue the American hostages seized in Iran in November 1979 (Document 2). Today, the FBI’s extensive presence overseas, via its legal attaché program, the subject of a Justice Department inspector general report (Document 17), allows it to produce information relevant both to criminal investigations and U.S. foreign intelligence requirements.

The counterintelligence component of the organization’s mission involves the related activities of investigating foreign intelligence services and their employees, both those employing diplomatic cover and those operating as illegals, and detecting Americans – including members of the FBI and CIA – who are providing classified information to those services. Thus, documents in the posting include the executive summary of an inspector general report on the activities and detection of FBI agent Robert Hanssen, who provided extraordinarily sensitive intelligence to the Soviet Committee of State Security (KGB) and the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) over two decades (Document 12).

The posting also includes an examination of the FBI’s successes and failures. One involved the case of the CIA’s Aldrich Ames, arrested in 1994, but not after he disclosed the identities of a number of CIA sources to the Soviet Union. (Document 6). In addition, there is the case of Katrina Leung (Document 25), who had sexual relationships with at least two FBI agents while appearing to provide information on developments within the government of the People’s Republic of China – but actually serving as a PRC agent. Further, the posting includes the reports produced by several security reviews under taken by RAND and an outside commission in the wake of the Hanssen fiasco (Document 7, Document 10).

Also represented in the briefing book are a number of FBI intelligence assessments concerning terrorism. A 1970 analysis focuses on the Fedayeen terrorist group (Document 1) while a 1984 study (Document 3) describes Iranian and Iranian-linked institutions in the United States – including both official institutions and educational foundations – that had (or could have) served as covers for clandestine intelligence collection and support to terrorist activities.

Other more recent assessments have focused on both the international and domestic terrorist threats. Thus, a Secret/Noforn assessment from April 2004 (Document 19) focuses on the threats from al-Qaeda as well as from U.S.-based groups. It reported that the “motivation and commitment to lethality remains as strong as ever” among al-Qaeda’s members, that the group continued to be interested in targeting international flights, and that few entities or individuals in the United States had direct connections to senior al-Qaeda leaders.

But while al-Qaeda was the greatest concern, the FBI also devoted analytical resources to evaluating the threat from a variety of domestic groups. A 2007 assessment (Document 30) noted the threat from animal rights extremists who “committed the overwhelming majority of criminal incidents during 2005 and 2006.” Several reports concerned white supremacist groups – including their possible use of suicide terrorism (Document 28), their infiltration of law enforcement (Document 26), and the phenomenon of “ghost skins,” (Document 27) who “strive to blend into society.” According to the reports, suicide terrorism was seen “primarily as a means of uniting a fractured movement,” while infiltration of law enforcement threatened the success of investigations and could “jeopardize the safety of law enforcement sources and personnel.”

Beyond estimates of the terrorist threat, the documents posted today illuminate various aspects of FBI counter-terrorist operations and organization prior to 9/11 or in its aftermath. Thus, the Department of Justice’s inspector general produced a lengthy report (Document 22) on the Bureau’s performance with respect to the Phoenix memo (warning in 2001 about Osama bin Laden’s possible plan to send operatives to the U.S. to train in civil aviation), the investigation of two hijackers, Khalid al-Mindhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi, and of Zacarias Moussaoui. Another inspector general report (Document 32) focuses on the FBI’s involvement in and observations of interrogations at Guantanamo Bay. In addition, the FBI’s controversial, and at times inappropriate, use of National Security Letters is explored in a 2008 inspector general report (Document 31).

Other documents, produced by the Congressional Research Service as well as the Justice Department’s Inspector General, explore FBI practices subsequent to 9/11 and, particularly, attempts to improve the Bureau’s ability to perform its counterterrorist mission. Among the topics examined are the FBI’s efforts to improve the sharing of intelligence (Document 15); to develop a highly trained, stable corps of intelligence analysts (Document 23); to better integrate headquarters and field office intelligence operations (Document 35); and to assess the impact of revised attorney general guidelines for domestic intelligence operations (Document 38).

Documents

Document 1: Federal Bureau of Investigation, The Fedayeen Terrorist – A Profile, June 1970. Secret.
Source: www.governmentattic.org

This monograph was prepared “to furnish Field Agents a profile of the fedayeen terrorist,” a focus of major concern early in the modern era of international – and especially Middle East-based – terrorism. The study is based on the analysis of ten fedayeen terrorist attacks in Europe and other information available to the FBI. One motivation for its production was “persistent reports” that terrorist attacks in Europe would be followed by attacks in the United States.
Document 2: Joint Chiefs of Staff, Memorandum for the Record, Subject: Briefing of FBI Representatives, September 25, 1980. Top Secret.
Source: Digital National Security Archive

This memo discusses the briefing of FBI representatives by a member of the Joint Staff with regard to intelligence needs in support of operations against Iran – specifically with regard to plans to rescue American hostages.
Document 3: Federal Bureau of Investigation, Threat Assessment of Pro-Khomeini Shiite Activities in the U.S., February 24, 1984. Secret.
Source: www.governmentattic.org

This analysis consists of four key parts – an examination of the Shiite religion, a survey of official Iranian diplomatic establishments in the United States (including the Iranian mission to the United Nations, the Iranian interests section, the Islamic Education Center, and the Mostazafin Foundation), main Iranian Shiite organizations in the United States, and Iranian Shiite threats.
Document 4: General Accounting Office, International Terrorism: FBI Investigates Domestic Activities to Identify Terrorists, September 1990. Unclassified
Source: Government Accountability Office

This GAO study was conducted in response to a request by the chairman of the House Judiciary Committee’s subcommittee on civil and constitutional rights. The chairman was responding to information contained in documents released under the Freedom of Information Act that concerned FBI monitoring of the Committee in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador (CISPES). The study focused on the basis on which the FBI was opening investigations, the scope and results of the investigations, possible FBI monitoring of First Amendment activities, and the reasons for closure of the investigations.

Document 5: Office of the Attorney General, Attorney General Guidelines for FBI Foreign Intelligence Collection and Foreign Counterintelligence Investigations, May 25, 1995. Secret.
Source: Federation of American Scientists

The guidelines in the document govern all foreign intelligence and foreign counterintelligence, foreign intelligence support activities, and intelligence investigations of international terrorism conducted by the FBI as well as FBI investigations of violations of the espionage statutes and certain FBI investigations requested by foreign governments. It also provides guidance to the FBI with respect to coordination with CIA or Defense Department activities within the United States.

Document 6: Office of the Inspector General (OIG), Department of Justice, A Review of the FBI’s Performance in Uncovering the Espionage Activities of Aldrich Hazen Ames, Executive Summary, April 1997. Unclassified.
Source: Department of Justice

This document is the unclassified version of the executive summary of a more extensive, and more highly classified report on the FBI’s role in the Aldrich Ames investigation. While the investigation “found that the lack of knowledge and experience in counterintelligence work” among some FBI managers seriously hampered the FBI’s effort in detecting Ames’ espionage, it also found that once the investigation of Ames was initiated the FBI “allocated enormous resources” and pursued the investigation “efficiently and professionally.”

Document 7: Commission for Review of FBI Security Programs, A Review of FBI Security Programs, March 2002. Unclassified.
Source: Federation of American Scientists

In its report, the commission, which was established in response to the discovery of FBI agent Robert Hanssen’s delivery of “vast quantities of documents and computer diskettes” filled with national security information to the Soviet Union and Russia, identified “significant deficiencies” in FBI security policy practice — noting that “security is often viewed as an impediment to operations.” The report also contains a number of recommendations to improve Bureau security – including establishing an independent Office of Security.

Document 8: David Walker, Comptroller General of the United States, FBI Reorganization: Initial Steps Encouraging but Broad Transformation Needed, June 21, 2002. Unclassified.
Source: Government Accountability Office

In testimony before a subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee, the head of the General Accounting Office discusses several aspects of the FBI’s proposed reorganization and realignment efforts — including the broader issue of federal government transformation, the realignment of FBI resources, the elements of a successful transformation, and the importance of Congressional oversight.

Document 9: G. Gregg Webb, “New Insights into J. Edgar Hoover’s Role,” Studies in Intelligence, 48, 1 (2003). Unclassified.
Source: www.cia.gov

This article focuses on the FBI’s operation of a foreign intelligence organization during World War II – the Special Intelligence Service – which focused on Latin America.

Document 10: Gregory T. Treverton, Richard Davidek, Mark Gabriele, Martin Libicki, and William (Skip) Williams, RAND Corporation, Reinforcing Security at the FBI, February 2003. Unclassified.
Source: FBI Freedom of Information Act Release

This RAND study was undertaken at the request of the FBI’s Security Division and reports the results of RAND’s assessment of the FBI’s efforts to establish a security program that would dramatically reduce the risk of another security compromise similar to that involving Robert Hanssen.

Document 11: Todd Masse, Congressional Research Service, Domestic Intelligence in the United Kingdom: Applicability of the MI5 Model to the United States, May 2003. Unclassified.
Source: Federation of American Scientists

In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, attacks one suggestion for a possible change in the U.S. approach to domestic counter-terrorist intelligence was to remove such responsibilities (along with counterintelligence) from the FBI and create a separate organization along the lines of the British Security Service (better known as MI-5). This paper examines both political and organizational considerations relevant to the applicability of the British model as well as summarizing pending legislation.

Document 12: Office of the Inspector General, Department of Justice,A Review of the FBI’s Performance in Deterring, Detecting, and Investigating the Espionage Activities of Robert Philip Hanssen, Executive Summary, August 14, 2003. Unclassified.
Source: Department of Justice

This review is the unclassified version of two classified reports on the same subject – a 674-page Top Secret/Codeword level report and a 383-page report. This version consists of five chapters, which examine Hanssen’s activities before joining the FBI and between 1976 and 1985; his career between 1985 (when he became supervisor of a technical surveillance squad in New York and offered his services to the KGB) and 1992; and deficiencies in the FBI’s internal security revealed during the OIG investigation. It also offers recommendations for changes in the FBI’s counterintelligence and security programs.

Document 13: Todd Masse and William Krouse, Congressional Research Service, The FBI: Past, Present, and Future, October 2, 2003. Unclassified.
Source: Federation of American Scientists

One part of this study is a review of the FBI’s history, its current status, and its future. In addition, it examines four issues facing Congress with regard to the Bureau – whether the FBI can adapt to a terrorist prevention role; some of the FBI’s criminal investigative work should be transferred to state and local law enforcement organizations; a statutory charter should be developed for the Bureau; and whether the planned collocation of the FBI’s Counterterrorism Division and the Terrorist Threat Integration Center risks allowing U.S. foreign intelligence entities to engage in domestic intelligence activities.

Document 14: Office of the Attorney General, The Attorney General’s Guidelines for FBI National Security Investigations and Foreign Intelligence Collection , October 31, 2003. Secret/Noforn.
Source: Federation of American Scientists

This document is the result of a review of existing guidelines for national security and criminal investigations that was carried out after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. The new guidelines authorize FBI investigations of threats to national security; assistance to state, local, and foreign governments in relation to national security matters; foreign intelligence collection by the FBI; the production of strategic analysis by the FBI; and the retention and dissemination of information from those activities.

Document 15: Office of the Inspector General,Department of Justice, FBI’s Efforts to Improve Sharing of Intelligence and Other Information, December 2003. Redacted/Unclassified.
Source: Department of Justice

This audit focused on the FBI’s identification of impediments to its sharing of counter-terrorism related intelligence; improvements in its ability to share intelligence and other information not only within the FBI but with the Intelligence Community as well as state and local law enforcement agencies; and the dissemination of useful threat and intelligence information to other intelligence and law enforcement organizations.

Document 16: National Commission on Terrorist Attack Upon the United States, Memorandum for the Record, “Interview of [Deleted],” December 29, 2003. Secret.
Source: www.cryptome.org

This memo reports on an interview with a FBI reports officer (whose identity has been deleted) by members of the 9/11 Commission staff. It provides background on the interviewee, while the subjects of the remainder of the memo include, but are not limited to, the Terrorism Reports and Requirements Section, terrorism reporting, general impressions of the FBI, as well as the role of the Office of Intelligence and of reports officers and their products.

Document 17: Office of the Inspector General,Department of Justice, FBI Legal Attaché Program, March 2004. Redacted/Unclassified.
Source: Federation of American Scientists

This audit examines the type of activities performed by the FBI’s Legal Attaché offices; the effectiveness of the offices in establishing liaison relationships with other U.S. law enforcement and intelligence organizations overseas; the criteria and process used by the FBI to locate offices; and the oversight and management of existing offices. The auditors reviewed operations at FBI headquarters and four of the Bureau’s 46 attaché offices.

Document 18: Federal Bureau of Investigation, Tactics Used by Eco-Terrorists to Detect and Thwart Law Enforcement Operations, April 15, 2004. Unclassified/Law Enforcement Sensitive.
Source: www.wikileaks.org

This assessment report focuses on sections of Earth First founder David Foreman’s Eco-Defense; A Field Guide to Monkeywrenching – which discuss some of the covers Foreman believes are used by law enforcement to infiltrate radical environmental groups and the means of identifying undercover law enforcement personnel.

Document 19: Federal Bureau of Investigation, The Terrorist Threat to the U.S. Homeland: An FBI Assessment, April 15, 2004. Secret/NOFORN.
Source: FBI Freedom of Information Act Release

This secret assessment concerns the threat from Al-Qaeda as well as domestic terrorists (including terrorists from the white supremacist, animal rights, and hacker communities). It includes an examination of “Islamic Extremist Terrorism Trends.”

Document 20: Alfred Cumming and Todd Masse, Congressional Research Service, FBI Intelligence Reform Since September 11, 2001: Issues and Options for Congress, August 4, 2004. Unclassified.
Source: http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organizations/39334.pdf

In the aftermath of the September 11 attacks there were numerous proposals for reform of FBI intelligence operations. This study examines five options for Congress to consider – including creation of a domestic organization similar to the United Kindgom’s Security Service (MI-5), transferring domestic intelligence responsibilities to the Department of Homeland Security, and creating a national security intelligence service within the FBI.

Document 21: Office of the Inspector General,Department of Justice, Internal Effects of the FBI’s Reprioritization, September 2004. Redacted/Unclassified.
Source: Department of Justice

This Inspector General report lays out the FBI’s new priorities announced by the Bureau’s director in May 2002: protecting the United States from terrorist attack, foreign intelligence operations, and cyber-based attacks. The report examines FBI changes in resource utilization from the 2000 and 2003 fiscal years to determine if the new priorities were reflected in FBI resource allocations.

Document 22: Office of the Inspector General, Department of Justice, A Review of the FBI’s Handling of Intelligence Information Related to the September 11 Attacks, November 2004. Unclassified.
Source: Department of Justice

This 449-page report provides background concerning the FBI’s counterterrorism effort, and examines three key aspects of the FBI’s pre-9/11 work – its handling of the Phoenix communication and the Bureau’s attention to the possible use of airplanes in terrorist attacks, its handling of the Zacarias Moussaoui case, and its performance with respect to two of the 9/11 hijackers (Khalid al-Mihhar and Nawaf Al-Hazmi). It also provides several recommendations with regard to the FBI’s analytical program, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act process, and interactions with the Intelligence Community.

Document 23: Office of the Inspector General,Department of Justice, FBI Efforts to Hire, Train, and Retain Intelligence Analysts, May 2005. Unclassified.
Source: Department of Justice

This Inspector General audit examines the FBI’s progress in meeting analyst hiring goals, analyst hiring requirements, establishing a comprehensive training program and reaching the training goals, analyst staffing and utilization in support of FBI activities, and retaining analysts. The auditors concluded that the FBI “made significant progress in hiring and training quality analysts, although significant issues remain[ed].”

Document 24: Alfred Cumming and Todd Masse, Congressional Research Service, Intelligence Reform Implementation at the Federal Bureau of Investigation: Issues and Options for Congress, August 16, 2005. Unclassified.
Source: Federation of American Scientists

This study attempts to assess the state of intelligence reform in the FBI, subsequent to the announcement that the Bureau would establish a National Security Service (which was ultimately known as the National Security Branch). It also discusses some of Congress’ options and areas for oversight.

Document 25: Office of the Inspector General,Department of Justice, A Review of the FBI’s Handling and Oversight of FBI Asset Katrina Leung, Unclassified Executive Summary, May 2006. Unclassified.
Source: Department of Justice

In May 2000, the FBI received information that Katrina Leung, one of the Bureau’s most highly paid assets who was actively spying for the People’s Republic of China against the United States. The Secret 236-page report that was the product of the resulting investigation is summarized in this executive summary, which reports on the FBI’s Chinese counterintelligence program, the 18-year period in which Leung was operated by James J. Smith (who was also involved in “an intimate romantic relationship” with her), and the FBI’s investigation of Smith and Leung. It also reports the OIG’s conclusions and recommendations.

Document 26: Federal Bureau of Investigation, White Supremacist Infiltration of Law Enforcement, October 17, 2006. Unclassified/Law Enforcement Sensitive.
Source: FBI Freedom of Information Act Release

This assessment, drawn from open sources and FBI investigations, provides an overview of white supremacist infiltration of law enforcement. It reports the threats posed to intelligence collection and exploitation, as well as to elected officials and other protected persons. It also explains why different supremacist groups can benefit from a single penetration.

Document 27: Federal Bureau of Investigation, Ghost Skins: The Fascist Path of Stealth, October 17, 2006. Unclassified/Law Enforcement Sensitive.
Source: FBI Freedom of Information Act Release

This intelligence bulletin focuses on ‘ghost skins’ – white supremacists who avoid giving any indication of their sympathy with Nazi beliefs and “strive to blend into society to be unrecognizable to the Jewish enemy.”

Document 28: Federal Bureau of Investigation, White Supremacy: Contexts and Constraints for Suicide Terrorism, April 20, 2007. Unclassified/For Official Use Only/Law Enforcement Sensitive.
Source: FBI Freedom of Information Act Release

Suicide terrorism is defined in this study as instances in which a terrorist intentionally kills himself or herself while attempting to kill others or operations in which the terrorist expects to be killed by police or other defenders. It examines the prospects for organized suicide campaigns as well as for the white supremacist movement to generate lone offenders.

Document 29: Office of the Inspector General,Department of Justice,FBI’s Progress in Responding to the Recommendations in the OIG Report on Robert Hanssen, Executive Summary, September 2007. Unclassified.
Source: Department of Justice

In the wake of the discovery that Robert Hanssen had provided the KGB and then the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) with extremely sensitive information about U.S. intelligence and counterintelligence activities, the Department of Justice’s Office of the Inspector General examined FBI security practices and 21 recommendations to improve the Bureau’s internal security and its ability to deter and detect espionage by its own employees. This report assesses the FBI’s response to some of those recommendations.

Document 30: Federal Bureau of Investigation, A Threat Assessment for Domestic Terrorism, 2005 – 2006, September 18, 2007. Unclassified/For Official Use Only/Law Enforcement Sensitive.
Source: FBI Freedom of Information Act Release

This study examines the activities, capabilities, opportunities, intent, and potential targets of a variety of domestic terrorist groups – including anarchist, animal rights, anti-abortion, Puerto Rican, and white supremacist extremists.

Document 31: Office of the Inspector General,Department of Justice, A Review of the FBI’s Use of National Security Letters: Assessment of Corrective Actions and Examination of NSL Usage in 2006, March 2008. Unclassified.
Source: Department of Justice

This extensive review covers several aspects of the FBI’s controversial use of National Security Letters: corrective actions taken by the FBI and Department of Justice in response to an earlier Inspector General report on the use of NSLs; the FBI review of the earlier NSL report; NSL requests by the FBI in 2006; the effectiveness of national security letters as an investigative tool; Inspector General findings on the FBI’s compliance with non-disclosure and confidentiality requirements; and the improper or illegal use of NSLs reported by FBI personnel in 2006. It concluded that the FBI and Justice Department had made “significant progress” in implementing the recommendations from the earlier report but also offered 17 additional recommendations.

Document 32: Office of Inspector General, Department of Justice, A Review of the FBI’s Involvement in and Observations of Detainee Interrogations in Guantanamo Bay, Afghanistan, and Iraq, May 2008. Unclassified.
Source: Department of Justice

This 438-page study consists of twelve chapters. Between the introductory and concluding chapters, it provides background on the FBI’s post-9/11 role and interrogation policies, early development of FBI policies regarding detainee interviews and interrogations, the concerns of Bureau agents about military interrogation activities at Guantanamo Bay, the Bureau’s response to the disclosures concerning Abu Ghraib, training for FBI agents in military zones, FBI observations regarding specific techniques used in Guantanamo, Afghanistan, and Iraq, and the Office of Inspector General’s review of alleged misconduct by FBI employees in military zones.

Document 33: Federal Bureau of Investigation, White Supremacist Recruitment of Military Personnel since 9/11, July 7, 2008. Unclassified/For Offical Use Only/Law Enforcement Sensitive.
Source: www.cryptome.org

This assessment, based on FBI case files from October 2001 to May 2008, examines why white supremacist extremist groups sought to increase their recruitment of current and former U.S. military personnel, the extent of their success, and the impact of recruitment on the white supremacist movement.

Document 34: Office of the Attorney General, The Attorney General’s Guidelines for Domestic FBI Operations, September 29, 2008. Unclassified.
Source: Department of Justice

These guidelines, according to the introduction, were designed to allow full utilization of “all authorities and investigative methods, consistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States,” to shield the United States from threats to national security (including terrorism) and the victimization of individuals by federal crimes.

Document 35: Strategic Execution Team, FBI, The New Field Intelligence, March 2008-March 2009, 2009. Unclassified.
Source: FBI Freedom of Information Act Release

This study explores domestic intelligence collection, in 2008-2009, by FBI field offices. It focuses on organization, roles and responsibilities, collection management, HUMINT collection, tactical intelligence, production and dissemination, measuring and tracking performance, and implementation.

Document 36: Vivian S. Chu and Henry B. Hogue, Congressional Research Service, FBI Directorship: History and Congressional Action, July 25, 2011. Unclassified.
Source: Federation of American Scientists

This report examines the history of the 1968 and 1976 legislation that is the basis for the current nomination and confirmation process for FBI directors. It also discusses the precedent for lengthening the tenure of an office and the constitutionality of extending Robert Mueller’s tenure as director.

Document 37: Federal Bureau of Investigation, Anonymous’ Participation in “Day of Rage” Protest May Coincide with Cyber Attack, September 14, 2011. Unclassified/Law Enforcement Sensitive.
Source: www.publicintelligence.net

This intelligence bulletin reports the FBI’s assessment that the group of activist hackers known as Anonymous was likely to participate in the ‘Days of Rage’ protest in New York scheduled for September 17, 2011. The bulletin also notes past Anonymous activities that involved cyber attacks.

Document 38: Jerome P. Bjelopera, Congressional Research Service, The Federal Bureau of Investigation and Terrorism Investigations, December 28, 2011. Unclassified.
Source: Federation of American Scientists

This study focuses on key components of FBI terrorism investigations. It reports on enhanced investigative tools and capabilities, the revision of Attorney General guidelines for domestic FBI operations, intelligence reform within the FBI, and the implications for privacy and civil liberties inherent in the use of preventive techniques to combat terrorism.

Notes

[1] Don Whitehead, The FBI Story (New York: Pocket Books, 1959); Fred J. Cook, The FBI Nobody Knows (New York: Pyramid, 1972); Sanford J. Ungar, The FBI: An Uncensored Look Behind the Walls (Boston: Little, Brown, 1976); William C. Sullivan with Bill Brown,The Bureau: My Thirty Years in Hoover’s FBI (New York: W.W. Norton, 1979); David J. Garrow, The FBI and Martin Luther King, Jr: From “Solo” to Memphis (New York: W.W. Norton, 1981); Richard Gid Powers, Secrecy and Power: The Life of J. Edgar Hoover (New York: Free Press, 1988); Ronald Kessler, The Secrets of the FBI (New York: Crown, 2011), and Tim Weiner, Enemies: A History of the FBI (New York: Random House, 2012).

[2] Novels involving the FBI include those in the Ana Grey series, by April Smith, including White Shotgun (New York: Knopf, 2011) and Rex Stout’s The Doorbell Rang (New York: Viking, 1965). Films include The FBI Story (1959), Manhunter (1986), Mississippi Burning (1988), and J. Edgar (2011). Television shows featuring the FBI include I Led Three Lives (1953-56), The F.B.I. (1965-74), The X Files (1993-2002), and Fringe (2008- ).

[3] “Quick Facts,” http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/quick-facts, accessed May 27, 2012.

[4] Kessler, The Secrets of the FBI, pp. 194-195.

[5] The Bureau’s COINTELPRO efforts are covered in Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, Final Report, Book II: Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976).

US-Saudi Sponsored Al Qaeda Killers in Syria


by Tony Cartalucci

Genesis of US-Saudi "Al Qaeda Frankenstein" in Syria

Al Qaeda militants funded, armed and arrayed against Syria by the West since at least 2007 receive PR boost from Western media as public awareness grows of their presence.

"To undermine Iran, which is predominantly Shiite, the Bush Administration has decided, in effect, to reconfigure its priorities in the Middle East. In Lebanon, the Administration has coöperated with Saudi Arabia’s government, which is Sunni, in clandestine operations that are intended to weaken Hezbollah, the Shiite organization that is backed by Iran. The U.S. has also taken part in clandestine operations aimed at Iran and its ally Syria. A by-product of these activities has been the bolstering of Sunni extremist groups that espouse a militant vision of Islam and are hostile to America and sympathetic to Al Qaeda." –The Redirection, Seymour Hersh March 5, 2007

"In the nineteen-eighties and the early nineties, the Saudi government offered to subsidize the covert American C.I.A. proxy war against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. Hundreds of young Saudis were sent into the border areas of Pakistan, where they set up religious schools, training bases, and recruiting facilities. Then, as now, many of the operatives who were paid with Saudi money were Salafis. Among them, of course, were Osama bin Laden and his associates, who founded Al Qaeda, in 1988.

This time, the U.S. government consultant told me, Bandar [bin Sultan] and other Saudis have assured the White House that “they will keep a very close eye on the religious fundamentalists. Their message to us was ‘We’ve created this movement, and we can control it.’ It’s not that we don’t want the Salafis to throw bombs; it’s who they throw them at—Hezbollah, Moqtada al-Sadr, Iran, and at the Syrians, if they continue to work with Hezbollah and Iran.” –The Redirection, Seymour Hersh March 5, 2007

Image: Former-US President George Bush and King for Life of Saudi Arabia, Abdullah bin Abdulaziz al Saud: "The loving parents of Al Qaeda." From the 1980’s to present day, the US and Saudi Arabia have funded, armed, and directed Al Qaeda while performing propaganda campaigns to bend public perception regarding the terrorist organization – portraying them as heroes, then villains, and back again. The "War on Terror" is a fraud.

….

America’s Implausible Deniability

Quite clearly, since 2007, the US and its allies were knowingly arraying sectarian extremists with direct ties to Al Qaeda against Lebanon, Syria, and Iran. Likewise in 2011, the US while leading NATO operations in Libya, armed, trained, funded, and provided air support for Libya Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) militants – also with direct ties to Al Qaeda.

Al Qaeda, by all accounts, is a joint US-Saudi creation, led by a Saudi (Osama bin Laden), and armed and funded by Western arms and cash laundered through Saudi Arabia to maintain both "plausible deniability" for the US, and to maintain a semblance of credibility for Al Qaeda militants across the Muslim World.

The now feigned, preposterous "fears" the US is expressing as the monster they’ve created becomes known to global public opinion, constitutes a new depth of depravity in regards to Western foreign policy, ultimately and irrevocably undermining the legitimacy of the West’s collective institutions and its status as a "stabilizing force" in global geopolitics.

The Associated Press joins Western governments in resigning its legitimacy and credibility with their recent report titled, "U.S. fears extremists could highjack goals of anti-Assad rebels," which claims:

Al-Qaida has advanced beyond isolated pockets of activity in Syria and now is building a network of well-organized cells, according to U.S. intelligence officials, who fear that the terrorists could be establishing a foothold that would be hard to defeat if rebels eventually oust President Bashar Assad.

AP also claims:

At least a couple hundred al-Qaida-linked militants already are operating in Syria, and their ranks are growing as foreign fighters stream into the country daily, current and former U.S. intelligence officials say. The units are spreading from city to city, with veterans of the Iraq insurgency employing their expertise in bomb-building to carry out more than two dozen attacks so far. Others are using their experience in coordinating small units of fighters in Afghanistan to win new followers.

While AP attempts to claim this is a disturbing trend that "US officials" are worried about, other representatives of the corporate-financier interests driving Western foreign policy are attempting to repackage Al Qaeda as "necessary" and shifting to a benign ally.

Image: As more photos depicting Syria’s so-called "Free Syrian Army" as fighting under the banner of Al Qaeda emerge, hiding Al Qaeda’s presence becomes more difficult for the Western press and the corporate-financier interests they represent. Therefore a simultaneous campaign is being waged to spin Al Qaeda’s presence as "recent" and "unexpected," while attempts are made to repackage the militant group as "heroes."

….

Recently, the Council on Foreign Relations, a premier Fortune 500-funded US think-tank, wrote in their article, "Al-Qaeda’s Specter in Syria," that:

"The Syrian rebels would be immeasurably weaker today without al-Qaeda in their ranks. By and large, Free Syrian Army (FSA) battalions are tired, divided, chaotic, and ineffective. Feeling abandoned by the West, rebel forces are increasingly demoralized as they square off with the Assad regime’s superior weaponry and professional army. Al-Qaeda fighters, however, may help improve morale. The influx of jihadis brings discipline, religious fervor, battle experience from Iraq, funding from Sunni sympathizers in the Gulf, and most importantly, deadly results. In short, the FSA needs al-Qaeda now."

Also, while AP attempts to portray this disturbing trend as recent, Reuters had reported in their article, "Outgunned Syria rebels make shift to bombs" that months ago that militants operating in Syria had already begun deploying terrorist bombings utilizing skills honed by extremist militants who fought in Iraq over the last decade.

The Telegraph reported even earlier, in November 2011, that Al Qaeda’s LIFG commander Abdul Hakim Belhaj had personally visited the Turkish-Syrian border to pledge cash, weapons, and fighters toward efforts in subverting Syria. Also in late 2011, reports that Libyan fighters, at least 600 of them, had already made their way to Syria began surfacing. As early as April 2011, the role of Al Qaeda in violence playing out all across the US-engineered "Arab Spring" was covered in Dr. Webster Tarpley’s "Al Qaeda: Pawns of CIA Insurrection from Libya to Yemen," where Syria was specifically mentioned as targeted by the West’s supra-regional campaign.

If the alternative media knew in 2011 that Al Qaeda was on the ground in both Libya and Syria (and elsewhere), and if the New Yorker already reported, point for point exactly who and how events would play out in Syria, as far back as 2007, how is it then that the US only now "fears" extremists of their own creation "hijacking" the goals of the so-called opposition?

The answer of course is the US knew from the very beginning, in fact, long before the beginning. The use of militant extremists to undermine and overrun Syria in an orgy of sectarian driven violence was the chosen method of operation since at least 2007. The US decided to deploy a proxy force, the same one in fact the West had deployed in the mountains of Afghanistan in the 1980’s. Al Qaeda was a creation of US-Saudi machinations. It is a continuing manifestation of their collective machinations to this day.

Like Weapons of Mass Destruction, Strict Conventions Must Be Arrayed Against "Proxy Wars."

Sarin nerve gas, anthrax, and nuclear weapons are considered weapons of such indiscriminate mass destruction, that their use is not only prohibited by both national and international laws and conventions around the world, but have entered civilization’s collective conscience as untenable and inexcusable to use on the battlefield.

Image: Nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons are considered weapons of mass destruction, and because of their indiscriminate nature, are banned by both national and international conventions. Proxy terrorists and mercenaries deployed into foreign countries (such as Libyans deploying to fight in Syria with US-Saudi backing) are not only indiscriminate, creating mass destruction and carrying out egregious atrocities, but do so for months, even years. Likewise their use should be banned by national/international conventions and nations caught employing them should have sanctions, severe penalties, and at the very least international condemnation leveled against them.

….

And just as Sarin nerve gas indiscriminately causes vast swaths of death, or a nuclear weapon kills all within its effective radius, so too do roving proxy armies, fanatically indoctrinated, monetarily motivated, armed, and funded by foreign interests, indiscriminately killing any and all that oppose them. While the West has used the possession and potential use of "weapons of mass destruction" as an excuse to violate the sovereignty of independent nation-states, it itself is deploying indiscriminate tactics leaving tens of thousands dead in nations like Libya, Somalia, Yemen, Sudan, Mali, and Syria.

If deploying weapons of mass destruction against a population is considered a grievous war crime because of the indiscriminate, unsparing effects of such implements, then surely deploying armed proxies consisting of fanatical killers is likewise a grievous war crime – perhaps more so because of the extended sustainability of such operations, and the capacity to keep on killing and terrorizing for months, even years.

And while we will continue to protest the machinations of the West, we must identify, boycott and replace the very corporate-financier interests underwriting this abhorrent agenda. The process of protesting is moot if it is not done in tandem with an appropriate application of real, tangible activism. To protest Western policy, but then patronize the very corporate-financier interests driving it, is self-defeating and ultimately futile.

İSTİHBARAT ALANI

Sınırsız, Seçkin, Sansürsüz, Kemalist Haber Blogu

Derin İstihbarat

strateji, güvenlik, araştırma, istihbarat, komplo teorileri, mizah, teknoloji, mk ultra, nwo

İSTİHBARAT

Şifresiz Yayın!

%d blogcu bunu beğendi: